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Abstract
In many domains, including law, decision makers often resort to
heuristics, which others have aptly described as "shortcuts that simplify and speed
up decision making" by, for example, "ignor[ing] some of the available
information" to arrive at "adequate, though often imperfect, answers to difficult
questions." In this paper, I argue that a patent system that more readily accepts the
use of damages heuristics may better serve public policy than one that requires
patent owners to substantiate every aspect of their claimed damages with rigorous
proof. More specifically, policymakers confronted with the choice between a
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proposed heuristic and an open-ended, nonheuristic standard (or an alternative
heuristic) ideally should choose the proposed heuristic when the sum of the
administrative and error costs associated with its use is lower than the sum of the
administrative and error costs resulting from the use of the nonheuristic (or
alternative heuristic). To be sure, there often may be no easy way to evaluate
whether this condition is satisfied-due both to the paucity of the evidence and to
the fact that the cost one attributes to error depends in part on the value one places
on the importance of accurate damages calculations to patent policy. Nevertheless,
I will argue that, at least in some recurring situations, policymakers can reach a
reasoned conclusion whether or not use of a particular heuristic is likely to improve
social welfare; and that, more generally, the patent system would benefit if courts
were more mindful of both the necessary tradeoffs to be made in calculating
damages and where the gaps in our knowledge lie.
I. Introduction
In law, as in everyday life, when people make decisions they often resort to
heuristics: "shortcuts that simplify and speed up decision making"' by, for example,
Callia Piperides et al., Group Report: What Is the Role of Heuristics in Litigation?, in HEURISTICS
AND THE LAW, 344, 374 (Gerd Gigerenzer & Christoph Engel eds., 2006). For other discussions of
heuristics in various fields, see, e.g., JOSEPH HENRICH, THE SECRET OF OUR SUCCESS: How
CULTURE Is DRIVING HUMAN

EvoLUTION,

DOMESTICATING

OUR SPECIES, AND MAKING US

&

SMARTER 189 (2015) (discussing, inter alia, how the internalization of social norms "may provide
a quick and efficient heuristic that saves the cost of running the mental calculations that consider
all the potential short- and long-term benefits and probabilistic penalties of an action"); DANIEL
KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 98 (2011) (defining a heuristic as "a simple procedure that
helps find adequate, though often imperfect, answers to difficult questions"); HUGO MERCIER
DAN SPERBER, THE ENIGMA OF REASON 166, 207-09, 218-21 (2017) (arguing, inter alia, that logic
itself can be viewed as a type of "heuristic tool that clarifies questions and suggests answers");
GEORGE P6LYA, How TO SOLVE IT: A NEW ASPECT OF MATHEMATICAL METHOD 113, 129 (2d ed.
1957) (stating that "[h]euristic reasoning is reasoning not regarded as final and strict but as
provisional and plausible only"); PHIUP E. TETLOCK & DAN GARDNER, SUPERFORECASTING: THE
ART AND SCIENCE OF PREDICTION 40 (2015) (noting that "when faced with a hard question, we
often surrepticiously replace with it with an easy one," that is, we employ a heuristic); Christoph
Engel & Gerd Gigerenzer, Law and Heuristics: An InterdisciplinaryVenture, in HEURISTICS AND
THE LAW, supra, at 1, 2-4 (tracing the origin and development of the term "heuristic," and arguing
that "[flrom an ecological (and evolutionary) point of view, " simple heuristics can be "highly
robust in an uncertain world, whereas complex strategies tend to overfit . . . . Less can be more.");
Gerd Gigerenzer & Peter M. Todd, Fast and FrugalHeuristics:,The Adaptive Toolbox, in SIMPLE
HEURISTICS THAT MAKE Us SMART 1, 14 (Gerd Gigerenzer, Peter M. Todd, & ABC Res. Group
eds. 1999) (stating that "[fjast and frugal heuristics employ a minimum of time, knowledge, and
computation to make adaptive choices in real environments," and thus "represent bounded
rationality in its purest form"); Jonathan Haidt et al., Group Report: What Is the Role ofHeuristics
in Making Law?, in HEURISTICS AND THE LAW, supra, at 239, 240-41 (defining a heuristic as "a
simple decision or action procedure that ignores some of the available information"); Peter Lee,
Patent Law and the Two Cultures, 120 YALE L.J. 2, 22-23 (2010) (describing heuristics as
"cognitive shortcuts that economize the selection and processing of information," and arguing that
certain formalist doctrines in patent law might be viewed as having served a heuristic function);
Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185
SCIENCE 1124 (1974) (discussing three common cognitive heuristics); Gerhard Wagner, Heuristics
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"ignor[ing] some of the available information" 2 to enable one to attain "adequate,
though often imperfect, answers to difficult questions." 3 Common examples of
legal heuristics include not only certain substantive rules-for example, bright-line
rules that narrow the scope of a liability determination in comparison with an openended, totality-of-the-circumstances standard-but also many procedural rules,
including those that govern the admissibility of evidence; the allocation of burdens
of production and persuasion; and presumptions, that is, evidentiary devices that
either permit or require the trier of fact to draw certain inferences upon proof of
some other, more readily demonstrated, fact.4 In principle, legal heuristics such as
presumptions can serve a variety of purposes-among them to economize on the
cost of adjudication, to allocate the burden of producing evidence to the party who
probably has better access to it, or to facilitate desired substantive ends'-though if

2

4

in ProceduralLaw, in HEURISTICS AND THE LAW, supra, at 281. Engineers and computer scientists
sometimes further distinguish ordinary (low-level) heuristics from higher-level "metaheuristics" or
"hyperheuristics" for selecting among lower-level heuristics (or generating new ones). See, e.g.,
Edmund K. Burke et al., Hyper-heuristics: A Survey of the State of the Art, 64 J. OPERATIONAL
RES. Soc'Y 1695 (2013) (defining a "hyper-heuristic" as "a method or learning mechanism for
selecting or generating heuristics to solve computational search problems").
Haidt et al., supra note 1, at 240-41.
KAHNEMAN, supra note 1, at 98.
See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE § 3.4 (1995) (discussing
presumptions); Douglas A. Kysar et al., Group Report: Are Heuristicsa Problem or a Solution, in
HEURISTICS AND THE LAW, supra note 1, at 103, 129-35 (discussing, among other things, brightline rules of substantive law as heuristics); Joachim Schulz, Rules of Evidence as HeuristicsHeuristics as Rules of Evidence, in HEURISTICS AND THE LAW, supra note 1, at 327, 335 (stating
that "shifting the burden of proof could be a concept equivalent to applying heuristics"); Wagner,
supra note 1, at 285, 300 (stating that "procedural law is replete with rules and institutions to
enable the court to enter into a decision without having investigated the case to the fullest extent
possible," and that certain "presumptions allow the court to generalize the most familiar fact
patterns as long as these are not challenged by" the opposing party). As discussed herein, even
multifactor standards may be heuristic to the extent they limit the decision maker's attention to
certain factors only; and, of course, as the rules versus standards literature makes clear, in addition
to stereotypically simple rules and complex standards there are complex rules and simple
standards. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J.
557, 566, 588 (1992).
To be sure, as Lisa Ouellette pointed out in her comments on an earlier draft of this paper, at
some level all legal rules are heuristics in the sense that we don't simply have one generic cause of
action whereby one person can sue another and ask the court to come to a decision that maximizes
social welfare. Cf Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1175,
1175-76 (1989) (describing an account of how the medieval King Louis IX of France-St. Louisallegedly conducted justice in a manner along these lines). Instead, in every body of law (patent
law being no exception) the state grants or recognizes and enforces certain rights upon the
fulfillment of certain conditions to achieve certain goals. For convenience, however, when I refer
to legal heuristics in this paper, I generally will be referring to lower-level heuristics intended to
simplify the determination of some specific fact or to attain some (more or less specific) policy
end.
See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 4, § 3.5, at 138; see also John M. Golden, Principlesfor
Patent Remedies, 88 TEX. L. REv. 505, 562, 570, 579-82 (2010); David McGowan, Irreparable
Harm, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 577, 582 (2010); Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to
the Law ofEvidence, 51 STAN. L. REv. 1477, 1503-04 (1999).
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left unchecked legal heuristics (like cognitive and other heuristics) also can generate
a variety of errors.
Like other bodies of law, the law of intellectual property (IP) employs a variety
8
of heuristics, including procedural rules, 6 substantive rules, 7 and presumptions _
6

Statutes of limitations, for example, are sometimes justified on grounds (among others) that on
balance they reduce the risk of inaccurate fact-finding (despite extinguishing some meritorious
claims) and economize on adjudication costs. See, e.g., Tyler T. Ochoa & Andrew J. Wistrich, The
Puzzling Purposes of Statutes of Limitation, 28 PAC. L.J. 453 (1997) (noting that, from the
standpoint of accuracy, statutes of limitations are "a blunt instrument"). As such, statutes of
limitations like those embodied in the Patent Act, see 35 U.S.C. § 286, and the Copyright Act, see
17 U.S.C. § 507(b), can be viewed as a type of heuristic. Patent law's so-called grace period or
statutory bar, which cuts off the inventor's ability to patent her invention if she has publicly
exploited it for more than one year, is another. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). For a discussion of how
some other recent procedural (and substantive) developments in patent law can be viewed as
heuristics, see Paul Gugliuzza, Quick Decisions in Patent Cases, 106 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming
2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfn?abstractid=2987289.
An example from trademark law would be the rule that secondary meaning may be inferred from
evidence of five years' continuous and substantially exclusive use of a mark, see 15 U.S.C. §
1052(f). Patent law traditionally has made use of certain rules and standards that conserve on the
administrative cost of determining whether a particular prior art reference was sufficiently "public"
as of the critical date. See, e.g., Egbert v. Lippmann, 104 U.S. 333, 336 (1881) (prior use of an
invention was public, where the inventor gave it over to another with no "injunction of secrecy,"
even if knowledge was confined to that single recipient); In re Hall, 781 F.2d 897 (Fed. Cir. 1986)
(prior publication of a dissertation was sufficiently public as long as it was publicly accessible and
indexed); Rosaire v. Baroid Sales Div'n, 218 F.2d 72, 74-75 (5th Cir. 1955) (prior use of an
invention was sufficiently public as long as the invention was practiced openly and in the ordinary
course of business, even if it was unknown to the general public). Some commentators have called
into question the status of the preceding patent cases, however, following enactment of the
America Invents Act in 2011.
An obvious example under U.S. law is that patents, registered copyrights, and registered
trademarks are all presumed valid, meaning that in litigation the person challenging validity bears
the burden of coming forward with evidence that the right at issue is invalid. See Microsoft Corp.
v. i4i Ltd. P'ship, 564 U.S. 91 (2011) (holding that, in patent infringement litigation, the alleged
infringer bears the burden of proving invalidity by clear and convincing evidence). Curiously,
U.S. patent law imposes a higher standard of proof on the person challenging validity than does
patent law in other countries-or U.S. copyright and trademark law, for that matter. See, e.g.,
Medforms, Inc. v. Healthcare Mgt. Solutions, Inc., 290 F.3d 98, 114 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding that a
defendant can rebut the presumption of validity of a registered copyright by a preponderance of the
evidence); Theodore H. Davis, Jr. & John H. Welch, Introduction to United States Annual Review:
The Sixty-Seventh Year of Administration of the Lanham Act of 1946, 105 TRADEMARK REP. 14
n.18 (2015) (noting the division of authority on the question of whether a person challenging the
validity of a registered U.S. trademark bears only a burden of production or the burden of
persuasion by a preponderance of the evidence). In U.S. administrative challenges to patent
validity, the standard of proof is preponderance of the evidence. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 316(e), 326(e).
Presumptions also have sometimes played a role in determining whether the IP owner is
entitled to injunctive relief. Until recently, courts in the U.S. applied a rebuttable presumption of
irreparable harm in deciding whether to grant preliminary injunctive relief in cases alleging patent,
copyright, and trademark infringement. See, e.g., Ranbaxy Pharms., Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 350 F.3d
1235, 1239 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (patents); Apple Comput., Inv. v. Franklin Comput. Corp., 714 F.2d
1240, 1254 nn. 11 & 13 (3d Cir. 1983) (copyright); Church of Scientology Int'l v. Elmira Mission
of the Church of Scientology, 794 F.2d 38, 43 (2d Cir. 1986) (trademarks). Since the U.S.
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though in recent years both the United States Supreme Court and the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit also have rejected some such devices for being
overly rigid or insufficiently tied to the facts of a given case.9 To date, however,
scholars have given little consideration to the topic of how the practices courts use
(or have rejected) for determining monetary compensation for patent infringement
might be viewed as heuristics intended to speed up and simplify decision making,
and whether greater reliance on damages heuristics would improve the working of
the patent system.
As I will show, for purposes of awarding damages, courts in fact have
employed certain heuristics while rejecting others, and on occasion even have
responded to perceived heuristic biases on the part of fact-finders-though often
without recognizing their own arguable susceptibility to heuristic biases or, more
generally, that the choice facing them is often between or among competing
heuristics. My principal argument therefore is that a patent system that more
consciously considered the advantages and disadvantages of competing heuristics
would better serve public policy than one that glosses over that choice-or that, in
certain contexts, requires patent owners to substantiate every aspect of their claimed
damages with rigorous proof. More specifically, policymakers confronted with the
choice between a proposed heuristic and an open-ended, nonheuristic standard or
alternative heuristic ideally should choose the proposed heuristic when the sum of
the administrative and error costs associated with its use is lower than the sum of
the administrative and error costs resulting from the use of the nonheuristic (or
alternative heuristic).'o

.

Supreme Court's decisions in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006) and Winter
v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 365 (2008), however, the lower courts have concluded
that this presumption no longer applies. See, e.g., Herb Reed Enters., LLC v. Florida Enter. Mgt.
Ltd., 736 F.3d 1239, 1242, 1248-49 (9th Cir. 2013) (trademarks); Robert Bosch LLC v. Pylon
Mfg. Corp., 659 F.3d 1142, 1148-49 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (patent); Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68,
74-75 (2d Cir. 2010) (copyright). eBay expressly held that the decision whether to grant a
permanent injunction is a matter of equitable discretion, thus reversing the Federal Circuit's ruleitself a rebuttable presumption-that prevailing patent owners were entitled to permanent
injunctions absent extraordinary circumstances. Most other countries nevertheless continue to
award the prevailing patent owner a permanent injunction as a matter of course. See THOMAS F.
COTTER, COMPARATIVE PATENT REMEDIES: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 182, 245-46, 305,
348-49 (2013); see also Titan Tire Corp. v. Case New Holland, Inc., 566 F.3d 1372, 1375-76 (Fed.
Cir. 2009) (discussing how the presumption of patent validity affects the court's evaluation of the
likelihood of success on the merits, one of the conditions for granting a preliminary injunction);
Lee, supra note 1, at 39-40, 56-59 (discussing the standards for granting injunctions in terms of
heuristics)
See, e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 604 (2010) (rejecting "exclusive" use of the machine-ortransformation test to determine patent eligibility); KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398,
419 (2007) (rejecting the "rigid and mandatory" application of the teaching-suggestion-motivation
test for determining nonobviousness); see also infra notes 80-81, 98, 144-50 and accompanying
text.
Consistent with Ouellette's insight that all legal rules are in some sense heuristic, see supra note 4,
perhaps it is a misnomer to characterize any legal decision or judgment as "nonheuristic" to the
extent legal decision making presents "practical problems ... for whiph computational algorithms

9

10
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To be sure, there often may be no easy way to evaluate whether this condition
is satisfied-due both to the paucity of the evidence and to the fact that the cost one
attributes to error depends in part on the value one places on the importance of
accurate damages calculations to patent policy." I have three general responses to
this point. First, I will argue that policymakers often can reach a reasoned
conclusion whether use of a proposed cost-reducing heuristic is likely to improve
social welfare-particularly where there is reason to believe that the evidence on
which courts will rely absent the heuristic is unlikely to generate a substantially
more accurate result than the heuristic. 12 (The courts' preference for the use of
comparable licenses over the Nash Bargaining Solution may be one salient
example.)' 3 Second, and relatedly, I will argue that the patent system would benefit
if courts were more mindful of both the necessary tradeoffs to be made in
calculating damages and where the gaps in our (and their) knowledge lie. This
means, among other things, that courts should be aware of their own potential
susceptibility to cognitive heuristics (such as "representativeness" and "anchoring"),
not just the possible presence of such biases among jurors.14
Third, and following from the preceding points, because we often lack good
empirical evidence that would assist in more accurate fact-finding-for example, on
questions such as the compensation the parties would have agreed to, had the
defendant not infringed-an ideal system would be one that is both receptive to new
empirical findings and that encourages both the parties themselves and third parties
to invest in developing better empirical evidence. To draw an analogy from a
radically different field of study, one of the most pressing tasks today in artificial
intelligence is the development of "hyperheuristics" that enable machines to engage
in dynamic learning-that is, to adjust their lower-level heuristics based on
feedback.'" What I am calling for in the field of patent damages is something
similar: for courts to embrace the concept of dynamic learning by (for example)
adopting presumptions or starting points based on existing empirical evidence,
simply are not available," Herbert A. Simon & Allen Newell, Heuristic Problem Solving: The
Next Advance in Operations Research, 6 OPERATIONS RES. 1, 5 (1958). Indeed, in other work I
have discussed how legal decision making necessarily involves the exercise of practical reason"a method that emphasizes the need for choice, deliberation, and communication in the face of
radical uncertainty .. . a way of simultaneously affirming and mediating among our conflicting
norms," Thomas F. Cotter, Pragmatism, Economics, and the Droit Moral, 76 N.C. L. REv. 1, 30
(1997), and thus could be viewed as the antithesis of deciding matters by means of a
"computational algorithm." In any event, and as suggested above, for purposes of legal decision
making the choice often will be between competing heuristics.

Cf Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REv. 379, 407 (1985) ("Whether a rule
exhibits certainty when applied in a given context depends upon whether the context is described
in a way that is hospitable to rule-like treatment.").
12 For a compatible view, see Golden, supra note 5, at 563 (observing that "a commitment to
optimizing patent remedies might generate futile and wasteful efforts to achieve perfect tailoring of
remedies across a wide spectrum of situations").
13 See infra Part III. D.2.b.
I
See id.
Is See Burke et al., supra note 1, at 1698.
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assuming it meets some minimal standard of adequacy; encouraging the parties and
others to develop better evidence over time; and when necessary to adjust these
initial presumptions or starting points in the light of the newly developed
evidence.1 6 Put another way, an imperfect heuristic may be not only preferable in
the short run when compared to the existing alternatives, but also over time may
improve the law by encouraging the development of more reliable empirical
evidence.

16

See Golden, supra note 5, at 561 (advocating the principle of "learning," that is, "fashioning
a
regime of patent remedies that encourages the production of information that can be used to
improve the regime itself"); Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Patent Experimentalism, 101 VA. L. REv. 65
(2014) (generally calling for more policy experiments to elicit better empirical evidence on the
effects of patents). The concept is in no way foreign to U.S. law. In the antitrust context, for
example, courts over time have come to conclude that certain conduct is nearly always
anticompetitive and thus deserving of summary condemnation, see FTC v. Actavis, Inc. 133 S. Ct.
2223, 2238 (2013), or alternatively that conduct once deemed anticompetitive may offer some
procompetitive virtues after all and therefore should not be per se illegal, see Leegin Creative
Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 886-87 (2007) ("[T]he per se rule is appropriate
only after courts have had considerable experience with the type of restraint at issue . . . and only if
courts can predict with confidence that it would be invalidated in all or almost all instances under
the rule of reason."). Similarly, as Willem Boshoff argues in a recent paper, the presumptions
(based on pre- and post-merger market shares) that courts and the enforcement agencies in the U.S.
apply in determining whether a particular merger is likely to suppress competition have evolved,
based not only on the courts' and agencies' adjustment of their Bayesian "priors" as the result of
learning from past experience but also on their increased sensitivity to the cost of measurement and
other errors (as well as institutional differences between the enforcers themselves). See Willem
Boshoff, Presumptions in Merger Control (Jan. 10, 2016) (unpublished paper, on file with author).
7 There may well be many other ways to generate empirical evidence on how patent damages law
could be improved: for example, by conducting lab experiments in which researchers judge how
close participants come to determining a predetermined correct amount of compensation when
certain evidence is disclosed or omitted; or perhaps by randomly assigning different rules to a
selection of patents (e.g., subjecting all even-numbered patents granted during a given year to a
regime of mandatory fee shifting and later assessing the aggregate costs incurred in litigating these
patents in comparison with a control group subject to the traditional rule). The courts and
Congress also could encourage greater experimentation on the part of district courts with respect to
matters such as early discovery on damages; routine bifurcation of liability and damages
determinations; greater use of court-appointed experts or of expert "hot tubbing," see Thomas F.
Cotter, Expert Testimony and Patent Damages: Could "Hot-Tubbing"Be the Answer? COMP. PAT.
REMEDIES
BLOG,
July
14,
2014,
available
at
http://comparativepatentremedies.blogspot.com/2014/07/expert-testimony-and-patentdamages.html (discussing a procedure, referred to as "hot tubbing," for vetting expert testimony in
Australia and the U.K.); greater experimentation regarding jury instructions; and, for damages
determinations, greater use of general verdicts accompanied by special interrogatories. Although
such experimentation wouldn't necessarily enable researchers to draw firm conclusions regarding
which procedures lead to more accurate results, some of them might generate useful information
on the impact of potential reforms on both the cost of litigation and the variation among expert
opinions under alternative regimes. I thank Lisa Ouellette for stimulating thought in this direction,
though for purposes of the present paper the principal learning tool I advocate is, as stated above,
the greater of use of presumptions and other starting points concerning matters such as profit splits
and royalty allocation.
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Part II presents a theoretical framework for choosing among competing
heuristics, based on a comparison of administrative and error costs. Part III. poses
the question of how important accuracy (that is, avoiding error) is in the context of
patent damages law-as well as, perhaps more importantly, the competing
meanings of accuracy in the present context. Part IV. applies the methodology
sketched out in Parts II. and III. to various issues surrounding the availability and
calculation of patent damages. Part V. concludes.
II. Legal Heuristics
As discussed above, researchers within many disciplines use the term
"heuristics" to refer to shortcuts or "rules of thumb" for reducing the time and effort
needed to reach a solution or decision." Computer scientists and engineers, for
example, have developed heuristic algorithms for solving optimization problems,
while behavioral psychologists have uncovered various cognitive heuristics by
which human beings navigate their way through the world. (Among the latter are
the "representativeness" heuristic, which predisposes human actors to evaluate the
19
probability that A is a member of class B by the extent to which A resembles B;
the "availability" heuristic, by which we "assess the frequency of a class or the
probability of an event by the ease with which instances or occurrences can be
brought to mind"; 20 and the "anchoring" heuristic, whereby our estimates often are
biased in favor of by an initial value with which we are presented. 2 1 We'll return to
all three at one point or another below.) In many settings, the use of heuristics is
desirable, as long as the solution arrived at is "good enough" in view of the
22
At the
potential stakes and the cost of employing more rigorous methodologies.
same time, however, heuristics are hardly foolproof in guiding us to accurate or
optimal decisions. Indeed, some applications of common cognitive heuristicssuch as the predisposition to stereotype, which is a manifestation of the
representativeness heuristic--can impose substantial costs on both the user and
(unfairly) third parties. Application of a heuristic to a given situation therefore must
be judged on the basis of whether it solves the problem at hand well enough in
comparison with other, costlier, alternatives-or alternatively, is the heuristic itself
the costlier alternative, in light of its potential flaws?
More relevant to present purposes, law too makes extensive use of heuristics in
To
establishing substantive and procedural rules for adjudicating disputes.
illustrate, suppose that a legal system is choosing between two possible procedures,

19

See generally sources cited supra note 1.
See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 1, at 1124.

20

Id. at 1127.

18
21

22

See id. at 1128. To the extent that reliance on these heuristics is a heritable human trait, heuristics
may have tended to confer a selective advantage on our remote ancestors by increasing the
probability of survival over a range of common experiences and environments. See, e.g., EDWARD
0. WILSON, CONSILIENCE: THE UNITY OF KNOWLEDGE 207-08 (1998) (proposing an evolutionary
explanation for cognitive heuristics).
See, e.g., Engel & Gigerenzer, supra note 1, at 4.
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P1 and P2, for resolving a particular type of dispute. P1 requires the decision maker
to consider all potentially relevant facts23 in order to arrive at the most accurate
result possible, while P2 is a heuristic. Since a heuristic is intended to exclude some
potentially relevant information, the administrative cost of applying P1 (call it ai)
should exceed the administrative cost of applying P2 (call this a2 ). 24 In addition,
each procedure may generate some erroneous results-for example, a judgment for
the defendant in a case in which a factually accurate reconstruction of events would
have resulted in a judgment for the plaintiff. These erroneous results in turn
produce error costs (e; and e2, respectively). The magnitude of these error costs
depends on two factors: how frequently errors occur, and the importance of accurate
decision making.25
This second factor-the importance of accurate decision making-depends on
several additional considerations. First, while one might expect accurate decision
making always to be important, the degree to which it is important may vary from
one setting to another. When the private stakes of the disputes are low, for
example, accuracy necessarily will be less important than when the private stakes
are high; absent substantial third-party effects, society might think twice about
incurring administrative costs of $1 million to resolve a dispute that is worth only
$100 to the parties. Relatedly, however, the public stakes of the dispute may be
high or low as well. To illustrate, suppose that the body of law regulating the

23

24

25

Cf Cass Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. L. REv. 952, 1000 (1995) (noting that factorbased standards cannot be "attentive to all aspects of the situation," because "[h]uman and legal
perception are inevitably selective"; "a system based on factors attends to much of the whole
situation but certainly not all of it"). The fact that simple rules can be over- and under-inclusive in
comparison with open-ended standards is of course a commonplace in the rules versus standards
literature, see, e.g., id. at 992-93; cf Kaplow, supra note 4, at 589 (noting that standards can be
over- and under-inclusive too, depending on how they are applied). Apropos of this latter point,
and as others have pointed out, some of my discussion above may seem to mirror the familiar
rules/standards debate-though with respect to patent damages in particular, as we shall see, the
choice courts often have to make is between competing rules (or competing standards or
competing presumptions or starting points), rather than simply between rules and standards. Thus,
for example, as discussed infra at Part IV. .D, courts could improve the patent system by
accepting the use of certain presumptions or starting points for calculating damages, and by
reconsidering some of the presumptions and other heuristics (such as the widespread use of
comparable licenses as evidence of royalties) that they do employ.
Of course, if the heuristic is a rule, a full comparison would need to take into account the cost of ex
ante promulgation of the rule as against the ex post cost of applying the standard, the cost of
providing advice regarding compliance, and the potential effects on settlement. With regard to this
last point, more predictable rules might seem, on the one hand, to make settlement more likely, but
also may reduce the cost of litigation and thus make litigation comparatively more attractive. See
Kaplow, supra note 4, at 562-63, 573 n.35, 574.
Cf Neil Komesar, A Job for the Judges: The Judiciary and the Constitution in a Massive and

Complex Society, 86 MICH. L. REv. 657, 691 (1988) (stating, in a discussion of standards of
judicial review, that "clear tests mean fewer cases brought, litigated, and appealed, and therefore a
smaller burden on the judiciary," but that "[s]uch clarity ... involves a degree of arbitrariness ...
which risks invalidating good legislation or accepting bad. The chances as well as the costs of
such an error vary with the subject matter and the legislation under review.").
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dispute at issue is intended to promote policy X, but that the policymaker has reason
to believe that policy X will be adequately served by a rule that is only
approximately accurate. As with the small private stakes dispute, at some point
additional investments in accuracy will not be worth the cost. A second
consideration is that the direction of expected errors might be relevant. In criminal
cases, for example, conventional wisdom holds that it's better to free nine2 6 (or
some other comparatively large number ofe) guilty defendants than to convict one
innocent. Put another way, in the criminal context, society has decided that the cost
of a false positive (a false conviction) is immensely greater than the cost of a false
negative (a false acquittal). On the other hand, in the civil context, the policymaker
may care less about errors that skew against the party deemed to be at fault, perhaps
on the normative ground that a conscious wrongdoer assumes (some) risk of error
(and thus suggesting that fault itself may be a relevant consideration in evaluating
the importance of accuracy). Yet another consideration is the range of possible
error. All other things being equal, the greater the range of possible outcomes (that
is, the greater the variance around the expected mean), the smaller the probability
that the parties will settle their dispute (thus raising administrative costs), and the
greater the likelihood that the more risk-averse party will be willing to settle on
unfavorable terms. 2 8 Moreover, when the bargaining range is enormous, parties
may dissipate much of the potential gains from trade in negotiation and strategic
behavior.29
In many settings, one would expect e2 to exceed el. For example, suppose that
the percentage of cases going to trial that plaintiffs "deserve" to win, based on an
accurate assessment of the facts, is 50%; and that P2 is the procedure employed by
Rabelais's Judge Bridlegoose to adjudicate disputes: by throwing dice. 30 Assuming
that the dice are fair, one would expect the court to reach the correct outcome 50%
of the time: plaintiffs and defendants each will win half the cases they deserve to
win, and half they deserve to lose. By contrast, even if PI is highly imperfect, one
would expect it to perform better than this; otherwise we may as well just flip a coin
to resolve the dispute and pocket a,. More generally, the choice of P1 over P2
depends on whether a, + e; < a2 + e2 , that is, whether the sum of administrative and
26
27

28

29
30

4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND *358 (1769).
See Alexander Volokh, n Guilty Men, 146 U. PA. L. REv. 173 (1997).
A risk-averse applicant, "when faced with a choice between two gambles with the same expected
value, will usually choose the one with a smaller variability of return." WALTER NICHOLSON,
MICROECONOMIC THEORY: BASIC PRINCIPLES AND EXTENSIONS 538 (9th ed. 2004); see also
ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS 158 (5th ed. 2001).
See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, § 3.6, at 66-69 (9th ed. 2014).
In most English-language translations, the judge's name (Bridoye) is translated into its English
equivalent, "Bridlegoose." See FRANCOIS RABELAIS, GARGANTUA AND PANTAGRUEL 202-14 (J.M.
Cohen tr. 1955) [1546]; Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., Lawyer's Law, and the Little, Small Dice, 7 TUL.
L. REV. 1, 12 (1932). More recent translations and scholarship retain the original French name.
See, e.g., FRANCOIS RABELAIS, GARGANTUA AND PANTAGRUEL 558-80 (Michael A. Screech tr.
2006) [1546]. Cf Kaplow, supra note 4, at 587-88 (noting that a rule that decided disputes by
flipping a coin would result in inconsistencies).
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error costs resulting from P1 exceeds the sum of administrative and error costs from
P2. In the fanciful cases adjudicated by Judge Bridlegoose, one would assume that
al + el < a2 + e 2 even if a 2 is 0 or close to it-though one might imagine some realworld contexts in which dice-rolling actually would appear to be a rational way of
choosing among two outcomes, such as to resolve contested election results like that
in Bush v. Gore31 where the margin of victory lay within the margin of error.32 But
even in less unusual circumstances, the use of a simple heuristic in lieu of a
multidimensional standard will sometimes improve social welfare-for example, if
a; is substantially higher than a2, and the error costs are comparable because (due
perhaps to the inherent limitations of eyewitness testimony and the technology used
to reconstruct historic facts) much of the evidence that would be helpful to an
accurate reconstruction is simply not available.3 3 In such a case, the additional
investment in accuracy attendant on the use of P1 may be wasted.
Perhaps more commonly, the choice the policymaker faces will be between
two or more heuristics. To illustrate by way of bringing the discussion back to
patent damages, consider a dispute where the hypothetically accurate damages
award is d. (More on exactly what this might mean in the next part.) Suppose
further that directly calculating d is not feasible, and that the policymaker therefore
must choose from among two heuristics, HI and H2, to estimate d. We could
imagine both HI and H2 as generating a distribution function with a mean and a
variance; the closer the mean generated by either HI or H2 is to d, the more
accurate HI or H2 is. For example, suppose (again for illustrative purposes) that
the use of HI results in a damages award of d with a probability of 0.5, a damages
award of 1.25d with a probability of 0.25, and a damages award of 0.75d with a
3'

Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 103, 127 (2000).

32 A practical problem in such a case is that decisions rendered by arbitrary means may appear to lack
legitimacy. More generally, the observation that people often are subject to overconfidence biaswhereby we think we are more competent at evaluating evidence and making good predictions
than we really are, see KAHNEMAN, supra note 1, at 261-63; MERCETER & SPERBER, supra note 1, at
241-44; TETLOCK & GARDNER, supra note 1, at 181-conceivably could lead decision makers to
favor what passes for rigorous analysis (or multifactor balancing tests), even when such analysis is
objectively more likely to lead us astray than would an arbitrary rule. See also Greg Reilly,
Rethinking the PHOSITA in Patent Litigation, 48 LOYOLA UNIV. L.J. 501 (2016) (arguing that
tailoring the law of nonobviousness to the abilities of lay decision makers, "including more
legalistic and objective doctrines that reduce the role of the PHOSITA . . . may be optimal in
practice, even if second-best in theory"). Cf HENRICH, supra note 1, at 104-06 (discussing how in
some cultures divination randomizes certain decisions and therefore serves as an effective
counterbalance to cognitive biases that would undermine a group's aggregate self-interest).
3 See Sunstein, supra note 23, at 1012 (1995) ("Often a legal system should make the choice
between rules and rulelessness on the basis of a contextual inquiry into the aggregate level of likely
errors and abuses .... Even a poor fit, in the form of overinclusive and underinclusive rules, can
be tolerated when individualized decisions would result in a similar level of inaccuracy .... "); see
also Kaplow, supra note 4, at 586-88 (noting that both rules and standards may be applied
inconsistently). Another analogous situation is that faced by a small-to-medium investor, who is
often better off investing in a stock market fund than retaining a financial advisor who, despite her
vaunted expertise, in the long run is unlikely to outperform the market. See, e.g., KAHNEMAN,
supra note 1, at 212-16; TETLOCK & GARDNER, supra note 1, at 316 n.10.

170

TEXAS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 25:159

probability of 0.25. The mean damages award using method HI is d, the variance is
approximately 0.03d, and the standard deviation is 0.18d. By contrast, suppose that
method 112 results in a damages award of d with a probability of 0.5, a damages
award of 1.1d with a probability of 0.25, and a damages award of 0.75d with a
probability of 0.25. The mean damages award generated with the use of H2 is
approximately 0.96d, its variance is 0.02d, and its standard deviation is 0.13d.

,

Because the mean associated with H2 is slightly lower than the mean
associated with HI, accuracy considerations alone would incline the policymaker to
As discussed above, however, there may be other
choose HI over H2.
considerations of equal or greater relevance. If a; is substantially greater than a2
for example, the relatively small increase in accuracy associated with HI may not
be worth the additional increment in cost, particularly if the private or public stakes
of the dispute are small. The more the mean award calculated using H2 deviates
from d, however, the more problematic the use of H2 may appear-though again,
one would need to consider the administrative costs of the heuristics, as well as the
direction and range of potential error. Thus, in an industry in which patents are
unlikely to play a major role in stimulating invention or other desirable public ends
(as discussed below), a substantial deviation downwards from d would be more
tolerable than in an industry in which patents have a more significant effect,
whereas a substantial deviation upwards might risk generating a net surplus of
social costs over benefits. (On the other hand, if the defendant is an intentional
infringer, a mean above d might seem less troubling.3 4 ) Similarly, if H2 is
associated with a much greater variance than HI, the use of H2 will tend to
disadvantage the more risk-averse party, while rendering settlement marginally
more difficult as well. 35
To be sure, if we knew what d was, we wouldn't have to go through this
exercise at all; and surely no sane person would imagine that we can estimate and
compare the means and variances associated with competing heuristics. Indeed, one
might argue that most of the relevant considerations are simply too opaque or
disputatious for the above analysis to promise any payoff at all in the real world.
But maybe not-after all, if we really have no basis for choosing a heuristic over a
complex standard, or for choosing one heuristic over another, we may as well take a
page from Judge Bridlegoose and simply roll the dice (or flip a coin, or whatever
random process comes to mind). In particular, two of the considerations I discussed
Of course, much may depend on how we define "intentional." Exposing someone who knowingly
uses a patented technology in the objectively good-faith (but perhaps incorrect) belief that the
patent is invalid or noninfringed to a risk of greater damages liability could reduce social welfare
by chilling some potential challenges to weak patents. I return to this point in Part IV. .B.
35 The range of possible outcomes may be a very pressing problem in contemporary patent damages
law. See, e.g., John C. Jarosz & Michael J. Chapman, The Hypothetical Negotiation and
Reasonable Royalty Damages, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REv. 769, 809 (2013) (stating that "for opinions
issued since 1978 in which a suggested royalty rate was reported for both the patent holder and the
infringer, the range has been as high as three hundred to one," and that "[i]n many cases, the
difference has been more than twenty to one. And the range has not declined over time.").
34
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above arguably could serve as "free-floating" heuristics applicable in a wide range
of disputes. First, if the defendant is at fault (again, under whatever definition of
"fault" seems appropriate in light of the policies underlying the relevant body of
law), it might be sensible to tolerate a degree of error that is believed to favor the
plaintiff. As John Golden has noted, contract law applies an analogous heuristic
(as does, I would note, antitrust law).37 Second, as noted above (and as Golden
notes as well) 3 8 all else equal it doesn't make sense to require the parties and the
court to incur adjudication costs that exceed the value of the dispute-a factor that
may be quite relevant when the private stakes are small.
Even aside from these examples, for reasons discussed below I doubt that a
radical skepticism is universally warranted; in many instances, at least a rough
estimate of comparative administrative costs and accuracy may be feasible enough
to enable a rational, if not infallible, choice among heuristics and standards.
Nevertheless, to make such a (rational) choice requires a closer look at the policies
served by accurate damages calculations, and of the various sources of possible
errors resulting from competing heuristics. The next portion of this paper addresses
these issues.
III. Is Accuracy Important?
To think clearly about what an "accurate" damages award would include
requires some preliminary analysis of the purposes served by awarding patent
damages in the first place. In this regard, I start from the premise that the ultimate,
albeit abstract, goal of any patent system-and, presumably, of its constituent parts
including the law of patent damages-is to maximize the surplus of the social value
generated by the system over the social costs.3 9 Depending on one's point of view,
See John M. Golden, Reasonable Certainty in Contract and Patent Damages, 30 HARv.
J.L.
TECH. 257, 258 (2017) (arguing that patent damages law should, like contract law, apply "a
standard of reasonableness [that] allows courts, in addressing the admissibility or sufficiency of
evidence, to take into account context-specific factors ... including the size of claimed damages
amounts, the relative innocence or blameworthiness of the parties, and the potential availability or
non-availability of better methods or evidence for developing a damages calculus."); see also Carl
Shapiro, Property Rules v. Liability Rules for Patent Infringement (May 4, 2016), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract id=2775307 (manuscript at 24) ("Arguably, in a more balanced
system an independent inventor would face less liability.").
To be sure, in some respects a context-specific approach might seem the antithesis of a
heuristic-which, after all, is intended to limit consideration of some relevant evidence. My
response is that, although some heuristics may take the form of simple bright-line rules, applicable
under all or most circumstances, one could justifiably consider context before deciding whether a
simplifying heuristic is appropriate. Perhaps a set of metaheuristics designed to assist in choosing
among heuristics (e.g., in a small-stakes case choose PI over P2), would be useful in this regard.
See Burke, supra note 1.
See, e.g., Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555 (1931) (holding
that, once the antitrust plaintiff proves the fact of injury, it faces a lesser burden of proving the
amount).
See Golden, supra note 36.
See, e.g., Thomas F. Cotter, Innovation and Antitrust Policy, in 2 OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
&

36

37

3
39
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the social benefits may include not only the creation, disclosure, and
commercialization of new inventions, but also the role patents (may) play in
facilitating technology transfer and attracting venture capital.40 Social costs include
the omnipresent administrative and transaction costs, the potential monopoly costs,
and (to the extent they are distinct from transaction costs) other costs associated
with restricting access, including holdup costs.4 1 Unsurprisingly, no one knows
how to craft a system of patent rights that perfectly achieves this hypothetical ideal:
even if there were consensus on exactly what counted as a social benefit and what
counted as a cost, a social planner intent on implementing such a system would
need a common metric for comparing costs and benefits; perfect information about
how the magnitude and distribution of costs and benefits under varying
configurations of patent rights; and the political capital to carry out the system's
execution. That's a tall order.42
Instead of aiming directly to achieve the maximum surplus of costs over
benefits, then, we make (at best) educated guesses about the optimal design of
patent rights through the construction and enforcement of the various rules and
standards that make up patent law. By most accounts, the law of patent damages
takes these (mostly substantive) rules as a given and (ideally) restores the patent
owner to the position she would have occupied-that is, to the position that
substantive patent law entitled her-but for the infringement. 43 In this way, patent
damages law (again, ideally) indirectly serves patent law's ultimate goal of
maximizing the surplus of benefits over costs. Seen in this light, the compensatory
goal of patent damages law can itself be viewed as a heuristic, because the goal of
restoring the patent owner to the position she would have enjoyed absent the
infringement is a shortcut of sorts for approximating the reward that would be
granted under the ideal patent system.

ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 132, 136 (Roger D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol eds. 2014) [hereinafter Cotter,
40

Innovation]; Thomas F. Cotter, Misuse, 44 Hous. L. REV. 901, 940 (2007).
See, e.g., Thomas F. Cotter, Patent Remedies and PracticalReason, 88 TEX. L. REv. SEE ALSO
125, 126 (2010). On the venture capital point in particular, see Joan Farre-Mensa et al., The Bright
Side of Patents, USPTO EcoN. WORKING PAPER SERIES No. 2015-5 (Jan. 2016), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Patents%20030216%20USPTO%20Cover.pdf,

which reports the results of a study of 45,819 first-time patent applications filed by U.S. startups
since 2001 and posits a causal relationship between approval of the application and a startup's
subsequent ability to "create jobs, enjoy faster sales growth, innovate more," and to go public or be
acquired. The effect was more pronounced in the IT sector than in biotech, given that startups in
the latter field "tend to be founded by experienced scientists, the quality of whose research can be
evaluated using a variety of sources such as academic publications and ... grants."
41 See Cotter, Innovation, supra note 39, at 136.
42 Indeed, a state that had the informational and political capability to create and manage such a
system probably wouldn't need to do so, since presumably it could induce the optimal quantity of
innovation though a centralized system of grants and prizes-though as Ouellette suggests, in
theory greater use of policy experiments could assist in generating useful information about the
effects of patents in specific contexts. See Ouellette, supra note 16.
43 See Cotter, supra note 40, at 130-3 1.
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On the other hand, compensation is not the only possible goal that might be
consistent with the ideal. An alternative approach would be to award damages with
an eye to deterring rather than compensating for infringement, since perfect
deterrence, like perfect compensation, would leave the patent owner no worse off as
a result of the infringement." (Indeed, perfect deterrence might seem preferable to
perfect compensation, because perfect deterrence would conserve on the cost of
adjudicating disputes.) In theory, a costless and perfectly-enforced system that
awarded restitutionary damages would achieve perfect deterrence by rendering all
acts of infringement unprofitable. Under such a system, an implementer who could
make a more efficient use of the patented invention, than could the patent owner,
would negotiate a license with the latter, while a less-efficient would-be user would
avoid use altogether. (A system under which injunctions were awarded just prior to
the commencement of infringement would achieve the same result.) In the real
world, however, where costs are nontrivial and enforcement imperfect and subject
to error-a problem that might result in overdeterrence of lawful conduct-the issue
of whether compensation or restitution better aligns with the goals of the patent
system is not so easy to resolve. For what it's worth, I've argued elsewhere that the
best practice is probably for courts to view compensatory damages as the default
remedy, and to award damages enhancements only when needed to attain further
deterrence.4 5 As discussed below, however, the distinction between compensation
and restitution is sometimes illusory;46 moreover, to the extent the two do differ, a
preference for compensatory over restitutionary damages (or vice versa) may hinge
on the heuristics deployed to estimate what compensatory or restitutionary damages
are in a given setting.

Furthermore, some scholars have argued that the optimal patent damages
regime would not make compensation (or deterrence) the touchstone but rather
would try to calibrate the patent owner's reward with its R&D costs. On this view,
an invention that resulted from huge R&D expenditures ex ante would garner a
larger damages award ex post than would one that required only a smaller
investment.4 7 Such a system would be similar to a system of ex post prizes, except
that the reward would be payable primarily by private actors rather than by
government. For a court to accurately calibrate the reward, however, would require
very good ex post information, and it is questionable (to say the least) whether the
judiciary would be up to such a formidable task. (Practical problems also might
arise in apportioning the resulting damages among several defendants or potential
defendants.) 4 8 Further, unless courts tempered such awards by taking into account
4
45
46

A third possible goal would be punishment. See infra text accompanying note 81.
See, e.g., COTTER, supra note 8, at 63-65.
See infra note 56.

47

See Ted Sichelman, PurgingPatent Law of "PrivateLaw" Remedies, 92 TEX. L. REv. 516 (2014)
(proposing, as a theoretical ideal, a system in which courts would calibrate damages, some of
which might be payable by the government rather than by the defendant, in light of R&D costs and

social benefits).
48

See Mark A. Lemley, Taking the Regulatory Nature of IP Seriously, 92 TEX. L. REv. SEE ALSO
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social benefits along with R&D costs (as Sichelman recommends),49 such a
proposal might encourage courts to award high damages to compensate for large
R&D costs even when the value of the resulting invention, in terms of the economic
advantages it bestows in comparison with alternatives, is slight. (Of course, such a
system also would avoid awarding large damages in cases in which the patent
incentive played little or no role in generating the invention, and this would seem to
be a plus. But perhaps the better response to such cases is to exercise greater
vigilance ex ante, by granting fewer or weaker patents in fields that do not rely
heavily on the patent incentive.) Put another way, if we want the patent system to
induce the invention of economically valuable inventions, the better policy for both
practical and economic reasons is to reward results, not effort, though presumably
the two will often run in sync. In this regard, compensatory damages at least have
the virtue of promising a greater reward for substantial contributions to the art than
for modest or trivial ones. At bottom, though, it's important to recognize that
awarding compensatory damages is merely a heuristic device that, like other
heuristics, screens out some information that in theory would be relevant but the
consideration of which might prove too costly, time-consuming, and error-prone.
Moreover, even if compensation is the appropriate general (or meta-) heuristic
for awarding damages, in theory its importance might vary from one setting to
another. As discussed above, for example, if the private stakes of the dispute are
low, it may not make much sense for courts to overinvest in getting damages awards
"just right." More controversially, perhaps there also are identifiable cases in which
(regardless of the private stakes at issue) the public stakes of the dispute might

justify the use of some cost-reducing heuristic to estimate damages, rather than
devoting too much effort to ensuring that patent owners are fully compensated. The
empirical evidence, after all, suggests that patents probably play a lesser role in
encouraging invention, disclosure, and commercialization in fields such as
information technology, where simultaneous invention and inadvertent infringement
appear to be commonplace,o than in fields such as pharmaceuticals and industrial

49

5o

107, 113 (2014), http://www.texaslrev.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Lemley-92-SeeAlso.pdf
See id. at 116. In a somewhat similar vein, Zhang and Hylton argue that, under present law, some

patents confer social value that exceeds the private value the patent owner is able to capture (an
observation that others have made as well), and that as a result aggregate investment in invention is
likely socially suboptimal. To remedy this perceived problem, they would authorize courts to
grant additurs or enhanced damages in a wider variety of cases than at present. See Mengxi Zhang
& Keith Hylton, Optimal Remedies for Patent Infringement Hylton and Zheng, available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=2698413. I'm inclined to think this would
give rise to many problems, though, including difficulties in estimating social value and chilling
effects on downstream innovation.
See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Ignoring Patents, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 19; Christopher A. Cotropia
& Mark A. Lemley, Copying in PatentLaw, 87 N.C. L. REv. 1421 (2008). On the other hand, the
"signaling" function may be more important for some of these latter technologies, see supra note
40 and accompanying text, though perhaps the goal of accurate compensation is less important in
litigation involving these patents if it is their mere existence, rather than their specific content, that
conveys the signal to VCs.
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chemicals. 5 ' On the other hand, such a principle might be viewed as undermining
rule-of-law values; and even if not, to apply such a principle a policymaker would
need some basis for predicting the direction of likely errors resulting from the use of
a proposed cost-reducing heuristic, since errors that favored plaintiffs would likely
reduce social welfare. Then again, it may be (as some have argued) that application
of the standard methodologies courts already use tends to induce defendant-favoring
errors, though I remain skeptical.52
See, e.g., Wesley M. Cohen et al., ProtectingTheir IntellectualAssets: Appropriability Conditions
and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not), NBER WORKING PAPER No. 7552 (Feb.
2000), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w7552 (based on a survey administered to 1,478
R&D laboratories in the United States in 1994, concluding that while patents "are still not one of
the major mechanisms in most industries when the views of all firms are considered ... they can
be counted among the major mechanisms of appropriation in a more sizeable minority of
industries," including drugs, medical equipment, and chemicals); Joseph A. DiMasi & Henry G.
Grabowski, The Cost of Biopharmaceutical R&D: Is Biotech Different? 28 MANAGERIAL
DECISION ECON. 469, 476-77 (2007) (estimating the price of bringing a new drug to market at $1.3
billion in 2005 dollars); Bronwyn H. Hall & Dietmar Harhoff, Recent Research on the Economics
of Patents, NBER WORKING PAPER 1773, at 16-18
(Jan. 2012), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/wl7773 (noting that the (rather limited) empirical evidence on the
effect of patent disclosure suggests that it is most useful with respect to pharmaceuticals and
chemicals). But see Golden, supra note 5, at 555-56 (counseling against discrimination on the
basis of business models, and warning "against the danger that ... efforts to 'reform' patent law
will become overly subject to social prejudice or special interests."); Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Do
Patents Disclose Useful Information?, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 545, 548 (2012) (reporting that, in a
more recent survey of nanotechnology researchers, 64% of respondents claimed to read patents; of
these, 70% did so in search of technical information; and "[o]f those reading patents for scientific
(rather than legal) reasons, 60% found useful technical information.").
Einer Elhauge, for example, argues that in general damages are likely to be undercompensatory
due to factors such as hindsight bias, difficulties that patent owners may face in communicating
value to juries, and damages estimation techniques that shortchange accuracy for administrative
ease. See Einer Elbauge, Do Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking Lead to Systematically
Excessive Royalties?, 4 J. COMP. L. & ECON. 535, 557 (2008). (Hindsight bias, by the way, is itself
sometimes viewed as a cognitive heuristic. See, e.g., Ulrich Hoffrage & Ralph Hertwig, Hindsight
Bias: A Price Worth Payingfor Fast and Frugal Memory, in SIMPLE HEURISTICS THAT MAKE Us
SMART, supra note 1, at 191.) What Elhauge refers to as hindsight bias, however, would seem to
cut in favor of high awards where use of the invention has resulted in higher-than-expected
benefits and low awards where it has resulted in lower-than-expected benefits. Even if this is
properly characterized as bias (which I think is doubtful, for reasons discussed below), it would
seem that the errors would cancel out. As for difficulty in communicating value to jurors,
notwithstanding a few multimillion or billion dollar awards, median patent damages awards are
relatively low. See Thomas F. Cotter & John M. Golden, EmpiricalStudies Relating to Patents&

5'

52

Remedies, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (Peter

Menell et al., eds., Edward Elgar Publishing forthcoming 2016) (reviewing the literature).
Whether or not this fact supports Elhauge, however, depends on whether he is right in claiming
that damages estimation techniques shortchange accuracy, an assertion for which he cites no
specific examples-though to the extent such methods exist, as I argue in the text above, they
sometimes may be justified. Finally, Elhauge argues that, even if errors in calculating damages are
symmetrically distributed around a mean of actual patent value, there will be systematic
undercompensation because infringers will opt for litigation when patent value is expected to be
higher than the average award, and will negotiate for a license when it is lower, thus on average
depressing both awarded damages and negotiated royalty rates. See Elhauge, supra, at 557-59; see
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Yet another matter to consider is exactly what the goal of compensation should
be understood to mean. At the most literal level, achieving compensation would
require ensuring that the owner is restored to precisely the financial position it
would have held had the infringer not infringed. In a case in which the
infringement deprived the patent owner of sales of articles incorporating the
patented invention, this would mean, at a minimum, awarding the owner her lost
profits on those lost sales, which is what the typical lost profits award is intended to
do. Note, however, that there are several other possible losses which the patent
system may, or may not, choose to compensate, among them attorneys' fees and
costs; interest; lost profits on sales of unpatented but nonduplicable articles that
compete with the infringing article; 53 lost profits on lost sales of convoyed goods;5 4
other losses caused in fact but possibly excluded under the doctrine of proximate
cause; net opportunity costs; future losses due to unrecoverable market share; and
loss of chance. I will return to some of these matters in Part IV. below.
Alternatively, if the infringement didn't deprive the patent owner of a sale
(either because the owner doesn't sell any products covered by or competing with
the patented invention, or because absent the infringement the defendant would
have licensed the invention or employed a noninfringing alternative) one could
imagine compensation taking the form of a "lost royalty" 56 in the sense of the
also Golden, supra note 5, at 568-69; Norman V. Siebrasse, Accuracy ofDamages Awards (citing
other sources making the same or an analogous argument) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author). Such a strategy would require a good deal of foresight on the part of infringers, however,
as well as willingness to ignore the high cost of litigation and (in the U.S. and some other
countries) the risk of enhanced damages if the defendant knowingly infringes.

s3 See Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1548-49 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (affirming a
lost profits award on lost sales of goods covered by another patent, not in suit, which Rite-Hite
sold in competition with defendant's infringing product).
54 See id. at 1550-51 (reversing an award for lost sales of convoyed goods that merely "as a matter of
convenience or business advantage" were sold together with the principal good that competed
against the infringing product).
5
U.S. courts, unlike the counterparts in other countries, do not award damages for "loss of chance,"
that is, for the actuarial value of profits that would have been earned on certain sales, unless there
is a greater-than-fifty-percent likelihood that such sales would have been made. See Thomas F.
Cotter, Bobst v. Heidelberg: A Recent French Case on Lost Profits, ComP. PAT. REMEDIES BLOG
http://comparativepatentremedies.blogspot.com/2014/01/bobst-v24, 2014 3:53AM),
(Jan.
heidelberg-recent-french-case.html. Unlike their counterparts elsewhere, U.S. courts also do not
compensate a defendant who is subsequently found to have been wrongfully enjoined, beyond the
amount of the plaintiff's bond. See Thomas F. Cotter, Damagesfor a Wrongly Issued Injunction,
COMP.
PAT.
REMEDIES
BLOG
(Apr.
4,
2014
7:48AM),
/
http://comparativepatentremedies.blogspot.com 2014/04/damages-for-wrongly-issuedinjunction.html.
56 Alternatively, one could imagine the "lost royalty" as a restitutionary reward of the royalty the
defendant otherwise would have paid the plaintiff. See Thomas F. Cotter, Reining in Remedies in
Patent Litigation: Three (IncreasinglyImmodest) Proposals,30 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 1,
25-26 (2013) (discussing some observers' characterization of reasonable royalties as
restitutionary). On this reasoning, the distinction between compensation and restitution is, as I
suggested above, sometimes more illusory than real. To the extent patent law requires the
disgorgement of the infringer's entire profit resulting from the use of the invention, however, as
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royalty the trier of fact believes the parties actually would have negotiated had they
been inclined to do so. Unless the patent owner offers everyone a uniform
established royalty,57 however, calculating the amount of such a lost royalty
necessarily would involve a degree of hypothetical reconstruction. Moreover, the
reasonable royalties that courts actually do award are not intended literally to
duplicate the award the parties actually would have negotiated, but rather are said to
reflect the amount the parties would have agreed to, ex ante, with knowledge that
the patent was valid and infringed.
In the real world, by contrast, negotiated
royalties would be discounted to reflect the parties' perceptions that the patent
might be invalid or not infringed. Conventionally, the assumption of validity and
infringement is justified in order to avoid a double-discounting problem that
otherwise would arise.59 In other recent work, however, Norman Siebrasse and I
have argued that the assumption also reflects a deeper principle that patent damages
are best viewed as a means to the end of providing patent owners with a reward that
is commensurate with-though not equal to the full social value of-their
contribution to the art, rather than (exclusively) as a historical reconstruction of the
state of the world that would have existed, but for the infringement. 60 On this view,
the conventional framework for awarding reasonable royalties is nothing more than
a legal fiction and therefore should be evaluated (and where necessary, modified)
based on its utility for achieving the desired substantive end, rather than for its
faithfulness to an illusory reality.6 1 Under our approach, a court should aspire to
award the royalty the parties would have agreed to ex ante based on all relevant
information that is available ex post (that is, at the time of trial). Whether one
agrees or not, the point to be made here is simply that both the conventional
approach to reasonable royalties and our proposed tweak depart from a purely
compensatory model, since neither is intended literally to replicate the award the
parties actually would have negotiated ex ante.62

opposed to merely the royalty it should have paid for that use, the distinction between
compensation and restitution can be substantial.

See, e.g., Nickson Indus. v. Rol Mfg. Co., 847 F.2d 795, 798 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Roger D. Blair

&

5

Thomas F. Cotter, Rethinking Patent Damages, 10 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1, 7-8 (2001)

(discussing established royalties).
58

5

0

See, e.g., Lucent Tech., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d
See, e.g., Stephen H. Kalos & Jonathan D. Putnam, On
Economic Interpretation of "Infringer's Royalties ",
Norman V. Siebrasse & Thomas F. Cotter, A New
Royalties in Patent Litigation, 68 FLA. L. REv. 929, 937
See Siebrasse & Cotter, supra note 59, at 936, 946-47;

1301, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
the Incomparabilityof "Comparable": An
9 No. 4 J. PROPRIETARY RTS. 2 (1997);
Frameworkfor Determining Reasonable
(2016).
Norman V. Siebrasse & Thomas F. Cotter,

The Value of the Standard, 101 MINN. L. REv. 1159, 1177 (2016) [hereinafter Siebrasse & Cotter,

61

62

Value]. I therefore argue that courts should depart from the conventional ideal of awarding the
estimated royalty a willing licensor and licensee would have agreed to ex ante (before the
infringement), by taking into consideration ex post evidence of patent validity and infringement,
the amount of use, or other relevant matters-which may result in an award that is higher or lower
than the parties would have expected ex ante.
See Siebrasse & Cotter, supra note 59, at 945-46.
Both approaches are also distinct from a "pure" ex post model, under which the royalty
would be
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In contrast to these approaches, Omri Ben-Shahar has argued that patent law
errs by according the prevailing patent owner the greater of either its actual (ex
post) lost profit or its expected (ex ante) royalty. 63 I've argued elsewhere that BenShahar's analysis fails to distinguish the circumstances under which a patent owner
would prefer lost profits to a reasonable royalty, i.e., when the owner makes rather
than licenses the patented invention.64 For present purposes, however, I will note
only that in theory one could construe the goal of compensating the patent owner as
requiring-contrary to the suggestion floated in the preceding paragraph, and even
in the context of lost profits awards-an award for the owner's expected rather than
actual loss. An award of expected lost profits would be administratively very
complex, however, and if my critique of Ben-Shahar's analysis is correct would
offer no countervailing benefit to the standard approach.65
IV. Specific Applications of Patent Damages Heuristics
Having presented the general concept of heuristics and the problems toward
which patent damages heuristics in particular may be directed, I turn my attention in
this part to the specific heuristics that courts either have applied or considered
applying in this latter context. Section A provides a brief description of the forms
of legal heuristics (such as presumptions) that are available to courts in this context.
Section B then presents a more detailed discussion of three specific purposes for
which heuristics are or may be employed: first, to determine a patent owner's
eligibility for a type of damages award ("eligibility heuristics"); second, to provide a
rough-and-ready estimate of the amount of such an award by equating it with some
other more easily determined amount ("equating heuristics"); and third, to regulate
the methodologies used for more granular calculations of damages amounts
("methodology heuristics"). This third class is further subdivided into heuristics
relating to lost profits or awards of defendant's profits; heuristics relating to
reasonable royalties; and heuristics relating to "fair, reasonable, and
As we shall see, although courts
nondiscriminatory" (FRAND) royalties.
manner, in other instances they
in
a
defensible
heuristics
have
applied
sometimes
either have used inappropriate heuristics or rejected what might have been
productive applications of heuristic approaches. Interestingly, in engaging these
matters courts sometimes have purported to take factfinders' cognitive biases into
account, though in others they may have fallen victim to such biases themselves.
A. Types of Heuristics
As noted in the Introduction, legal heuristics generally can take the form of
substantive rules or standards, procedural rules, and presumptions; and as we shall

64

the one the parties would negotiate ex post-a framework which would enable the patent owner to
extract a royalty that reflects holdup value-and from a disgorgement model, under which the
defendant is required to give up the entire profit actually earned from the infringement.
See Omri Ben-Shahar, Damagesfor Unlicensed Use, 78 U. CHi. L. REv. 7, 13-23 (2011).
See COTTER, supra note 8, at 71-72.

61

See id. at 71 n.62.

63
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see, patent damages law makes use of all three. Among the relevant substantive
rules and standards that courts in the U.S. or elsewhere have applied in this field and
which might be viewed as heuristic in nature are those relating to the relevance (or
not) of noninfringing alternatives to lost profit calculations,6 6 as well as those
establishing the factors upon which expert witnesses may base their royalty
estimates. 67 As for procedural rules, the most important are those relating to the
admissibility of expert testimony under the Federal Rules of Evidence, as applied to
the specific context of damages calculation.
Of arguably greater interest to the
present discussion, however, are presumptions, which straddle the border between
procedure and substance by requiring or permitting the factfinder to infer Fact X
upon production of evidence of some more readily accessible Fact Y. Presumptions
generally come in different varieties, ranging from so-called conclusive
presumptions (which really are just substantive rules of law), to rebuttable (burdenshifting) presumptions, such as the presumption of validity, to permissive
presumptions (which when applicable permit, but do not require, the trier of fact to
draw certain conclusions). 69 As others have noted, presumptions may function to
reduce adjudication costs; relatedly, to allocate the burden of production on Fact X
to the party with better access to it; or to increase the probability of attaining a
desired substantive goal.70 Many of the damages heuristics discussed below can be
viewed as presumptions of one type or another.
In addition, many damages-related heuristics are not really presumptions at all
but rather starting points, background assumptions, or priors which courts in certain
contexts have approved, and in other instances rejected, for use in awarding
damages. In 2011, for example, the Federal Circuit laid to rest one such heuristic,
the so-called "Rule of Thumb," under which an expert could take as a starting
assumption the premise that patent licensors generally expect to share 25% of the
profit derived from the sale of a product embodying the patented invention.7 2 As
we shall see, however, some of these types of heuristics still remain in play, while
others (like the Rule of Thumb itself) have been rejected.

6

67
68

69
70
71

72

See infra notes 115-32 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 133-34 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., infra notes 151-58 and accompanying text (discussing the admissibility of
testimony
based on Nash Bargaining). More generally, rules limiting the admissibility of potentially relevant
evidence function as heuristics to the extent they are intended to conserve on adjudication costs or
to preclude the trier of fact from basing its decision on possibly unreliable or substantively
improper factors.
See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 4, § 3.4, at 136-37.
See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., infra notes 73-77 and accompanying test (discussing the presumption of harm).
See Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (characterizing
the
25% rule as "a fundamentally flawed tool for determining a baseline royalty rate in a hypothetical
negotiation" and holding that "[e]vidence relying on the 25 percent rule of thumb is thus
inadmissible under Daubert and the Federal Rules of Evidence, because it fails to tie a reasonable
royalty base to the facts of the case at issue.").
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B. Eligibility Heuristics
Courts sometimes have employed heuristics to help determine if the claimant is
eligible to recover a certain class of damages at all. Section 284 of the U.S. Patent
Act, for example, states that "[u]pon finding for the claimant the court shall award
the claimant damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event
less than a reasonableroyalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer"
In Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc.,74 the Federal Circuit
(emphasis added).73
interpreted the italicized language to mean that, even when the patent owner fails to
introduce admissible evidence quantifying the amount of its loss, the court still has
an obligation to "determine what constitutes a reasonable royalty from the record
evidence" 7 5-in effect, creating a rebuttable presumption that the patent owner is
entitled to something as a consequence of the infringement. The rule is consistent
with practice in some other countries,76 but it provides no guidance on how to

§ 284.

7

35 U.S.C.

74

Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 757 F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
Id. at 1328. Further:

7

...
if the patentee's proof is weak, the court is free to award a low, perhaps
nominal, royalty, as long as that royalty is supported by the record ....
Thus, a fact finder may award no damages only when the record supports a zero
royalty award. For example, in a case completely lacking any evidence on which
to base a damages award, the record may well support a zero royalty award. Also,
a record could demonstrate that, at the time of infringement, the defendant
considered the patent valueless and the patentee would have accepted no payment
for the defendant's infringement. Of course, it seems unlikely that a willing
licensor and willing licensee would agree to a zero royalty payment in a
hypothetical negotiation, where both infringement and validity are assumed.
At summary judgment, as is the case here, a judge may only award a zero royalty
for infringement if there is no genuine issue of material fact that zero is the only
reasonable royalty. Thus, if a patentee raises a factual issue regarding whether it is
due any non-zero royalty, summary judgment must be denied. In any event, simply
because a patentee fails to show that its royalty estimate is correct does not, by
itself, justify awarding a royalty of zero at summary judgment, as the district court

did here ....
Id.

76

See, e.g., Markus Schinknecht, DeterminationofPatentDamages in Germany, 43 IIC 309, 311-13
(2012) (discussing the German courts' "free discretion" (nach freier Oberzeugung) to estimate
patent damages under § 287 of the Code of Civil Procedure); see also Charlotte Scott, Damages
Inquiries and Accounts of Profits in the IPEC, 38 E.I.P.R. 273, 273 (2016) (asserting that the
procedural rules employed in the Intellectual Property Enterprise Court of England and Wales-a
sort of smallish-claims court in which damages are capped at E500,000-"enable a rough and
ready determination with more limited disclosure"). According to Sch6nknecht, in Germany "[t]he
injured party is hot required to prove the exact amount of its damage; rather, it is sufficient if it
presents a factual basis on which the court can establish 'at least a rough estimate' of the damage."
Schbnknecht, supra, at 312 (citing Federal Supreme Court (Tolbutamid), 1980 GRUR 841, 842,
translatedin 11 IIC 763, 764 (1980)). Statutory damages, which are (by far) the dominant form of
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calculate the royalty due when the parties' evidence is deficient. One might
imagine, though, that in such cases courts will have to take it upon themselves to
apply methodology heuristics akin to those I discuss in a subsequent section below,
based on whatever record evidence there may be concerning the amount of the use,
comparable license rates, and the advantages of the technology over alternatives.
For now, however, this appears to be an area in which U.S. patent damages law
remains largely underdeveloped. 77
The other principal examples of eligibility heuristics under U.S. patent law
relate to awards of enhanced damages and attorneys' fees. 78 With respect to
enhanced damages, the Patent Act states only that courts "may increase the damages
up to three times the amount found or assessed,"79 though traditionally courts have
held that such enhanced damages are available only for "willful" or "egregious" (or
some equally sinister-sounding adjective) infringement-an interpretation the
Supreme Court reaffirmed this past term in Halo Electronics, Inc. v. Pulse
Electronics, Inc.80 In this regard, the Court held that "although there is 'no precise
rule or formula' for awarding damages under § 284, a district court's 'discretion
should be exercised in light of the considerations' underlying the grant of that
discretion," which the Court described as "punitive" or "vindictive."8 1 (Deterrence
arguably remains a statutory purpose as well, as the Federal Circuit had previously
stated,82 though the Supreme Court didn't expressly mention deterrence in Halo.)

n

damages award for IP infringement in China, arguably are intended to play a similar role of
allowing the court to provide compensation when the evidence on lost profits, royalties, and
defendant's profits is lacking, though critics argue that awards of statutory damages are not closely
correlated with actual losses or gains. For discussion, see Jingjing Hu, Determining Damagesfor
PatentInfringement in China, 47 IIC 5 (2016).
Although, as I have noted elsewhere, one of the recent FRAND cases-Microsoft Corp. v.

Motorola, Inc., Case No. C10-1823JLR, 2013 WL 2111217, at *39-49 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 25,
2013), aff'd, 795 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2015)-arguably provides some insight into how judges can

78

determine damages without relying too closely on either side's damages calculation. See Thomas
F. Cotter, ComparativeLaw and Economics of Standard-EssentialPatents and FRAND Royalties,
22 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 311, 360 (2014); see also In re Marriage of Abu-Hashim, 14 N.E.3d
524, 531 (Ill. App. 2014) (affirming a trial judge's methodology for valuing a daycare business in a
divorce proceeding, on the ground that "where a party does not offer evidence of an asset's value,
the party cannot complain as to the disposition of that asset by the court").
There is, also, a presumption that the prevailing patentee be awarded prejudgment interest. See

General Motors Corp. v. Devex Corp., 461 U.S. 648, 657 (1983) (holding that, under 35 U.S.C. §
284, courts should award prejudgment interest absent a justification for not doing so); id. at 658
(Stevens, J., concurring) (referring to "a presumption favoring the award of prejudgment interest in
the ordinary case"). The presumption arguably functions as a heuristic by not requiring the
plaintiff routinely to demonstrate an entitlement to interest, and thus by relegating to the defendant
the task of demonstrating such unusual circumstances as would counsel against such an award.
7

80
8
82

35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012).
Halo Elec., Inc. v. Pulse Elec., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1934 (2016).
Id

at 1929, 1932.

See SRI Int'l, Inc. v. Advanced Tech. Labs., Inc., 127 F.3d 1462, 1468 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (referring
to deterrent and punitive purposes).
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In so ruling, the Court overruled In re Seagate Tech. LLC3-a case in which the
Federal Circuit held that to recover enhanced damages a patentee had to "show by
clear and convincing evidence that the infringer acted despite an objectively high
likelihood that its actions constituted infringement of a valid patent" and that "this
objectively-defined risk (determined by the record developed in the infringement
proceeding) was either known or so obvious that it should have been known to the
accused infringer" 84-as well as subsequent case law holding that willfulness was a
question of law to be reviewed de novo on appeal.85 Presumably still intact,
however, is Federal Circuit case law holding that once a court has found an act of
infringement to be willful, it may consider a variety of factors in deciding how
much (if at all) to enhance the actual damages up to the statutory maximum. 86
Taken together, the combination of a discretionary willfulness standard with a
list of potentially relevant factors to consider in determining the amount of an
enhancement doesn't sound very heuristic 87 (though it remains to be seen how the
lower courts will adapt to their new-found discretion). And to be fair, it's difficult
to articulate what an appropriate heuristic would be, absent some idea of the sort of
conduct courts should be trying to deter or punish-and what sort they shouldn't.
On this latter issue, however, it seems reasonably clear that we don't want to deter
firms from engaging in lawful conduct, such as permitting their employees to read
patents or attempting lawfully to design around patented technologies.88 This would
suggest that courts probably shouldn't penalize infringers who had a good-faith
belief that the patent in suit was invalid or not infringed, and relatedly that they
shouldn't infer that an infringement was deliberate just because the defendant (or
one of its employees) was aware of the patent. On the other hand, I've suggested

83 In re Seagate Tech. LLC, 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc).
84 Id. at 1371.
85 See Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Assocs., 682 F.3d 1003, 1007 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
86 See Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 816, 827 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (listing the relevant factors

87
88

as including (1) "Defendant's size and financial condition"; (2) "Closeness of the case"; (3)
"Duration of defendant's misconduct"; (4) "Remedial action by the defendant"; (5) "Defendant's
motivation for harm"; and (6) "Whether defendant attempted to conceal its misconduct").
As also noted by Gugliuzza, supra note 6, (manuscript at 62).
See, e.g., Thomas F. Cotter An Economic Analysis of EnhancedDamages and Attorneys' Feesfor
Willful PatentInfringement, 14 FED. CIR. B.J. 291, 323-36 (2004); Mark A. Lemley & Ragesh K.
Tangri, Ending Patent Law's Willfulness Game , 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1085 (2003); Lisa
Larrimore Ouellette, Halo v. Pulse and the Increased Risks of Reading Patents, WRITTEN
DESCRIPTION
BLOG
(June
16,
2016,
4:55
PM),
http://writtendescription.blogspot.com/2016/06/halo-v-pulse-and-increased-risks-of.html; see also

Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1935 2016 WL at *11 (noting that "[r]espondents and their amici are concerned
that allowing district courts unlimited discretion to award upto treble damages in infringement
cases will impede innovation as companies steer well clear of any possible interference with patent
rights."); id at 1937-38 (Breyer, J., concurring) ("The more that businesses, laboratories, hospitals,
and individuals adopt this approach [of settling or abandoning challenged conduct to avoid
litigation], the more often a patent will reach beyond its lawful scope to discourage lawful activity,
and the more often patent-related demands will frustrate, rather than 'promote,' the 'Progress of
Science and useful Arts."').
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elsewhere 8 9 that enhancements may serve a legitimate purpose when compensatory
damages alone (1) would leave the plaintiff worse off than it would have been but
for the infringement (perhaps because certain harms are not susceptible to
quantification); or (2) would leave the defendant in a better position than a willing
licensee (perhaps because the infringer avoids certain risks that a licensee normally
would shoulder); or (3) would be necessary to achieve adequate deterrence (perhaps
because the infringing act was of a type that often would go undetected, or the
defendant has deliberately driven up litigation costs to discourage an impecunious
patentee from filing suit). A heuristic that screened for the likely presence of these
factors as a precondition for awarding enhanced damages would both reduce the
cost of administration-precisely because it wouldn't be an open-ended, totality of
the circumstances inquiry-and would be less susceptible to errors resulting from
the overdeterrence of lawful, socially beneficial conduct.
Seen in this light, the Federal Circuit's now-defunct willfulness case law
(including but not limited to Seagate) may not have been too far off the mark when
viewed as a heuristic designed to discourage behavior on the part of defendants that
is objectively welfare-reducing. 90 As noted above,9 1 exposing someone who
knowingly uses a patented technology in the objectively good-faith (but perhaps
incorrect) belief that the patent is invalid or noninfringed to a risk of greater
damages liability could reduce social welfare by chilling some potential challenges
to weak patents. (Focusing on whether the infringer had such a good-faith belief at
the time it began infringement, as the Supreme Court now appears to direct, 9 2 also
See Thomas F. Cotter, Complete Set of Briefs Filed Thus Far in Halo and Stryker Enhanced
Damages Cases, COMP. PAT.
REMEDIES
BLOG
(Dec.
18,
2015,
1:15
PM),

http://comparativepatentremedies.blogspot.com/2015/12/complete-set-of-briefs-filed-thus-far.html.
Malani and Masur have argued that courts should award enhanced damages (payable from the
public fisc or by means of term extensions) in cases in which defendants unsuccessfully challenge
patent validity, in order to compensate for the risk of a wrongful invalidation. See Anup Malani
Jonathan S. Masur, Raising the Stakes in Patent Cases, 101 GEO. L.J. 637 (2013), a proposal that
Ouellette supports as well, see Ouellette, supra note 88. The amount of the appropriate
enhancement would depend on the probability of an erroneous invalidation, however, and I am
skeptical that courts or other policymakers could make such a determination with any degree of
confidence.
Assuming, that is, that the enforcement of valid and infringed patents promotes social welfare, and
that the nonenforcement of invalid and noninfringed patents doesn't. See supra text accompanying
notes 4, 34.
&

8

9

91

92

See supra note 34.

See Halo Elec., Inc. v. Pulse Elec., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1933 (2016).
The Seagate test . . . mak[es] dispositive the ability of the infringer to muster a
reasonable (even though unsuccessful) defense at the infringement trial. The
existence of such a defense insulates the infringer from enhanced damages, even if
he did not act on the basis of the defense or was even aware of it. Under that
standard, someone who plunders a patent-infringing it without any reason to
suppose his conduct is arguably defensible--can nevertheless escape any
comeuppance under § 284 solely on the strength of his attorney's ingenuity.
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reduces this risk but as suggested above poses a risk that firms will discourage their
employees from reading patents, out of fear that any infringement occurring
thereafter may be viewed as deliberate.) Moreover, by focusing only on objectively
reckless conduct, Seagate also reduced the circumstances under which enhanced
damages were available,9 3 thus reducing the risk of overdeterrence, and it certainly
narrowed the range of possible outcomes in comparison with an open-ended
standard.
A second example of an eligibility heuristic is the standard for awarding the
prevailing party its attorneys' fees. A patent damages system that focused
exclusively on compensation would favor awarding fees to the prevailing party,
plaintiff or defendant, as a matter of course; and in fact many countries purport to
follow this practice, though in reality the fees they award often are only a fraction of
the fees litigants actually incur. 94 Such mandatory fee-shifting nevertheless would
run counter to the general American Rule that each side bears its own fees; and in
theory such awards risk chilling some legitimate claimants from asserting their
rights as well as possibly threatening to drive up litigation costs and deter
settlement. 95

In any event, whether these theoretical objections are sound or not, U.S. patent
law permits fee awards only in "exceptional" cases,96 which according to the
Supreme Court means that courts should award fees only "to address 'unfairness or
bad faith in the conduct of the losing party, or some other equitable consideration of
similar force,' which made a case so unusual as to warrant fee-shifting." 97 For
present purposes the relevant question is whether a totality-of-the-circumstances
standard or a heuristic would be preferable for evaluating exceptionality. Until
recently, the Federal Circuit's practice was to award fees only when the losing party

93

94

9
96

97

But culpability is generally measured against the knowledge of the actor at the
time of the challenged conduct.
See Christopher B. Seaman, Willful Patent Infringement and Enhanced Damages After In re
Seagate: An Empirical Study, 97 IOWA L. REv. 417, 420, 444 (2012) (reporting that, after KnorrBremse Systemefuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
(en banc), first tightened the willfulness standard, findings of willfulness declined from 63.8% in
cases in which the issue was decided from 1983-99 to 48.2%, and that after Seagate they declined
further to 37.2%).
See COTTER, supra note 8, at 209, 276, 328. In comparison with a system in which fees are
awarded only under some conditions, the presence or absence of which may be contested by the
parties, mandatory fee-shifting also may conserve on adjudication costs-though some theorists
argue that fee shifting encourages parties to invest more in litigation. See id. at 148. Moreover,
additional costs may be incurred to evaluate the reasonableness and amount of the proposed fee,
though in some systems the prevailing party usually is awarded a fee set by statute or (for
plaintiffs) a fee equal to some arbitrary percentage of its actual damages. See id. at 276, 328.
See id. at 148-49 (reviewing economic literature on fee shifting).

See 35 U.S.C. § 285.
Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1753 (2014); see also id at
1756 (stating that "an 'exceptional' case is simply one that stands out from others with respect to
the substantive strength of a party's litigating position (considering both the governing law and the
facts of the case) or the unreasonable manner in which the case was litigated").

2018]

Patent Damages Heuristics

185

engaged in independently sanctionable misconduct or (shades of Seagate) when the
action was both objectively baseless and in subjective bad faith.98 In 2014,
however, in two companion cases that that foreshadowed its 2016 decision on
willfulness, the Supreme Court held that courts instead should apply a totality-ofthe-circumstances approach and should review decisions on fee petitions under the
deferential abuse of discretion standard. 99 As a result, fee awards now appear to be
somewhat more common'e-arguably a desirable outcome if one thinks that fee
awards should be more common, in order to compensate and to deter frivolous
litigation-though hardly routine, in view of the extant "exceptionality"
requirement.
As with the willfulness standard, the question of whether it is preferable to
have a totality-of-the-circumstances or a brightish-line rule for evaluating eligibility
depends on the underlying purpose of permitting the type of relief at issue. The
supposed purpose stated above ("to address 'unfairness or bad faith in the conduct
of the losing party, or some other equitable consideration of similar force') is,
unfortunately, vague, though the Court may well have been correct in construing it
to mean that Congress intended for fees to be awarded in at least a slightly greater
proportion of cases than would be possible under other bodies of lawo or the
9

See id. at 1754 (summarizing the Federal Circuit's approach as holding that "a case is
'exceptional' . . . 'when there has been some material inappropriate conduct related to the matter in
litigation, such as willful infringement, fraud or inequitable conduct in procuring the patent,
misconduct during litigation, vexatious or unjustified litigation, conduct that violates FED.R.Cv.P.
11, or like infractions' and that .'[a]bsent misconduct in conduct of the litigation or in securing
the patent,' . . . fees 'may be imposed against the patentee only if both (1) the litigation is brought
in subjective bad faith, and (2) the litigation is objectively baseless' in the sense that 'no
reasonable litigant could believe it would succeed"') (citations omitted). In view of this approach,
the Federal Circuit at one time spoke of a "presumption that an assertion of infringement of a duly
granted patent is made in good faith," Highmark, Inc. v. Allcare Health Management Systems,
Inc., 687 F.3d 1300, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (in the context of fee awards, quoting Medtronic
Navigation, Inc. v. BrainLAB Medizinische Computersysteme GmbH, 603 F.3d 943, 954 (Fed. Cir.
2010), as authority for a "presumption that an assertion of infringement of a duly granted patent is
made in good faith"), rev'd on other grounds, 134 S. Ct. 1749 (2014), though a later Federal
Circuit panel backed away from the characterization. See Kilopass Tech., Inc. v. Sidense Corp.,
738 F.3d 1302, 1314-15 (Fed. Cir. 2013), overruled on other grounds in Highmark Inc. v. Allcare
Health Mgt. Sys., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1744 (2014). Patent reform legislation proposed in the last few
years would introduce the opposite presumption by requiring the court to award fees unless it
"finds that the position and conduct of the nonprevailing party or parties were reasonably justified
in law and fact or that special circumstances (such as severe economic hardship to a named
inventor) make an award unjust." See Innovation Act, H.R. 9, Rep. No. 114-235, 114th Cong., 1st
Sess., § 3(b) (reported July 29, 2015), available at https://www.congress.gov/biIlIl4th-

9

congress/house-bill/9/text#toc-H7E6F9EAE82634024925 11 BD54A562BOB.
See Octane Fitness, 134 S. Ct. at 1756; Highmark, 134 S. Ct. 1744, 1748 (2014).
00 For review of the empirical studies to date, see Cotter & Golden, supra note 52 (manuscript at 15-

16).
101 See Octane Fitness, 134 S. Ct. at 1756-57 ("the first category of cases in which the Federal Circuit

allows fee awards-those involving litigation misconduct or certain other misconduct-appears to
extend largely to independently sanctionable conduct .... But sanctionable conduct is not the
appropriate benchmark. Under the standard announced today, a district court may award fees in the
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common-law exception to the American Rule. 102 Viewed in this light, the Federal
Circuit's more stringent test probably did generate higher error costs, by excluding
too many deserving fee petitions. On the other hand, the new standard will likely
raise adjudication costs, not only because fee petitions will become more common
but also because the range of possibly relevant considerations is greater than before.
This cost nevertheless may be worth incurring if greater resort to fee awards deters
a substantial number of frivolous claims or defenses, though a more permissive
standard for awarding fees would likely have even more impact.
C. Equating Heuristics
A second category of damages heuristics equates the damages due the plaintiff
with some other, more readily determined amount. These heuristics are at best only
very rough proxies for the harm suffered by the plaintiff or benefit enjoyed by the
defendant, and for the most part are now absent from U.S. practice. At one time,
however, courts sometimes inferred that the amount of the defendant's profit
attributable to the infringement was an appropriate "surrogate for the profits the
plaintiff would have earned but for the defendant's improper use," or that a loss of
sales (and hence the profits lost on those sales) during the period of the
infringement were attributable to the infringement. 10 3 From the standpoint of
accuracy however defined, such heuristics arguably leave something to be desired: a
reduction in the plaintiffs profits often will be attributable to many factors, and due
to differences in costs and other factors the amount of the defendant's profits may
bear little relation to what the plaintiff would have earned even if the two happen to
be direct competitors. Indeed, such heuristics might seem suspect even if they
served merely as rebuttable presumptions, since (all other things being equal) one
would expect the plaintiff, not the defendant, to be in a better position to produce
evidence substantiating and explaining its own losses.
Nevertheless, until recently courts in the U.S. did follow one patent damages
rule that functioned quite similarly to such otherwise discarded heuristics: namely,
that the prevailing design patent owner was entitled to recover the entire profit the
defendant earned from the sales of an infringing end product, regardless of whether
or to what extent those profits were attributable to the infringing design.1 04 The rule

rare case in which a party's unreasonable conduct-while not necessarily independently
sanctionable-is nonetheless so "exceptional" as to justify an award of fees").
102 See id at 1758 (characterizing the Federal Circuit's test as "so demanding that it would appear to
render § 285 largely superfluous. We have long recognized a common-law exception to the general
'American rule' against fee-shifting-an exception, 'inherent' in the 'power [ofj the courts' that
applies for 'willful disobedience of a court order' or 'when the losing party has 'acted in bad faith,
vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons . . . .') (citation omitted).
03 Blair & Cotter, supra note 57, at 11-12 (citing sources). Courts in some countries still are
authorized to consider the defendant's profit as evidence of the plaintiffs lost profit. See COTTER,
supranote 8, at 323-24 (quoting Japan Patent Act art. 102(2)).
'4

See Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 786 F.3d 983 (Fed. Cir. 2015), rev'd, 137 S. Ct. 429 (2016)
(No 15-777).
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was based on a literal reading of 35 U.S.C. § 289, which in relevant part states that
whoever without authorization sells an "article of manufacture" to which a patented
design "has been applied shall be liable to the owner to the extent of his total
profit. . . " (emphasis added).105 Given that complex products such as smartphones
can incorporate literally thousands of features, some patented and some not, a rule
requiring the disgorgement of the entire profit earned from sales of a device bearing
even a single infringing design seems like overkill (to say the least)-though for
present purposes it might be worth considering whether such a rule could be
justified as a simplifying heuristic that avoids the administrative cost of having to
apportion profits. The obvious problem, though, is that it would accomplish this
goal only at the risk of imposing enormous (and probably unnecessary, given
contemporary methods for quantifying damages) pro-plaintiff error costs. On
balance, it's hard to imagine that any rational patent damages regime would
consciously adopt such a rule today. 06
In any event, in late 2016 the U.S. Supreme Court overruled this interpretation
of § 289, holding instead that the statutory language requires the disgorgement only
of the entire profit attributable to the article of manufacture bearing the infringing
design, not necessarily the entire profit earned from sales of the end product. 107
Thus in the case of a smartphone, it's conceivable that the relevant article of
manufacture could be (for example) only the phone's case or its graphical user
interface, rather than the entire device. This reduces the risk of overdeterrence
somewhat-though not entirely, given that the relevant article of manufacture still
could incorporate many features (albeit fewer than the entire device), only one of
which is infringed. Moreover, the Court declined to provide any guidance on how to
define the article of manufacture in cases involving complex products, or how to
apportion the profit attributable to such an article.108 In the near term, at least, the
cost of adjudicating design patent infringement cases in the U.S. therefore is likely
to increase, as the lower courts grapple with resolving these issues and litigants with
presenting relevant evidence, presumably by means of expert testimony.
A second practice that appears (for reasons below) to reflect a substantive
economic error, but is worth evaluating for its possible merits as a heuristic, is that
when courts deny prevailing patent owners permanent injunctions they typically

35 U.S.C. § 289. Congress enacted in 1888 to eliminate a perceived burden faced by design patent
owners in quantifying their damages (which burden sometimes resulted, under the standards of the
time, in juries awarding only nominal damages). See Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Apple Inc., 137 S. Ct.
429, 432-33 (2016).
'06 On the other hand, many countries that permit awards of infringer's profits, under one doctrinal
theory or another, employ a rebuttable presumption that the profit derived from the infringement
equals the defendant's gross profit; the burden, in other words, is on the defendant to come forward
with evidence concerning what expenses should be deducted to arrive at the net profit derived from
the infringement. See COTTER, supra note 8, at 206, 325.
107 See Samsung, 137 S. Ct. at 434-35.
'os See id. at 436.
'0
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impose a postjudgment royalty the rate of which exceeds the prejudgment rate.'o0
Mark Lemley has aptly characterized this practice as a presumption of sortsnamely that the postjudgment rates should be greater than the prejudgment rate,
though not necessarily by how much'o-that shifts the burden to the defendant to
demonstrate why the rate should not change. As presumptions go, however, this
one is difficult to justify on the merits, since it both raises the cost of litigation and
reduces accuracy in comparison with a rule that the pre- and post-judgment rates
should equate. The reason for this latter observation is that, as Lemley has argued,
the prejudgment rate is supposed to be calculated on the assumption that the parties
knew the patent to be valid and infringed. Accordingly, there is no additional
relevant knowledge to be taken into account on that ground, and the pre- and postjudgment rates should equate."' Moreover, if (as I have argued) ongoing royalties
are preferable to injunctions in some cases because injunctions sometimes enable
defendants to extract royalties reflecting holdup value, increasing the postjudgment
rate seems to replicate the very risk that denying an injunction was supposed to
avoid. 12 Perversely, then, in the one setting in which an equating heuristic would
make sense the courts have rejected it.
D. Methodology Heuristics
The practices I referred to above as "equating heuristics" might be viewed as a
subset of a broader category of what I will refer to here as "methodology
heuristics"-that is, shortcuts used to estimate the profit or royalty due to the
plaintiff-with the main difference being that the heuristics I discuss in this section
are at least somewhat more narrowly focused than the ones discussed above.
Subsection 1 below discusses the methodology heuristics courts sometimes have
used to estimate the plaintiffs lost profit (or, in countries where such awards are
still available, the infringer's profit). Subsection 2 discusses and critiques the
various methodology heuristics used for calculating reasonable royalties, while

An Empirical
Assessment andProposed Framework, 23 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 203, 239 (2015) (reporting that,
from the date of the eBay decision through January 2015, district courts awarded mean and median
post judgment royalty rates that were 1.84 and 1.34 times the mean and median prejudgment
royalty rates, respectively).
110 See Mark A. Lemley, The Ongoing Confusion over Ongoing Royalties, 76 Mo. L. REV. 695, 706
(2011) (stating that "[o]n occasion, the Federal Circuit has found that changed circumstances
compel different royalty rates. The fact that circumstances can change provides a reason to make
the past damages measure a presumptive rather than a required basis for the ongoing royalty.")
09 See Christopher B. Seaman, Ongoing Royalties in Patent Cases After eBay:

(citing Applied Med. Res. Corp. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 435 F.3d 1356, 1361-63 (Fed. Cir. 2006)).
1 See supra text accompanying notes 58-59.
112 See COTTER, supra note 8, at 127. In an analogous vein, in a recent paper Carl Shapiro presents a
mathematical analysis leading to "rules of thumb" that when "switching costs are small relative to
the value of the patented technology, an injunction is likely to be the better remedy," whereas "if
the court believes it can measure the harm to the patent holder caused by infringement and the
benefits to the downstream firm from infringement with a high degree of accuracy, then ongoing
royalties are likely to be the better remedy." Shapiro, supra note 36 (manuscript at 24). Shapiro's
proposal strikes me as both analytically correct and administratively feasible.
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subsection 3 focuses on a specific category of royalties, namely the "fair,
reasonable, and nondiscriminatory" (FRAND) royalties that may be awarded for the
unauthorized use of certain standard-essential patents (SEPs). 113 As we shall see,
courts and commentators around the world are continuing their efforts to develop
appropriate FRAND heuristics.
1. Lost Profits andDefendant's Profits
Economists largely agree that an accurate measure of the profit the plaintiff
lost (or the defendant gained) as a result of the infringement cannot be gauged
absent a consideration of the infringer's next-best available noninfringing
alternative. To illustrate, suppose that a company that manufactures and sells
bicycles includes a bicycle suspension system that infringes a rival manufacturer's
Patent X. Had the company not infringed, however, it would have used an
114
alternative Y that is in the public domain.
If the company would have sold just as
many bikes using alternative Y as it made using Patent X-perhaps because
consumers perceive no functional advantage of X over Y-its infringement has cost
the patent owner no sales, and hence no lost profit on those sales." At most, the
patent owner would be entitled to a royalty based on whatever advantage (a
reduction in cost of production, maybe) that accrued to the defendant as a result of
the infringement. 16 What we shouldn't do, if our goal is to accurately measure the
loss caused by the infringement, is to assume that every infringing sale by the
defendant deprived its patent-owning competitor of a sale. Put another way, in a
case in which the defendant could have resorted to a noninfringing alternative,
which consumers would have found indistinguishable from the patented invention,
the patent owner's position would have been precisely the same absent the
113 Standard-setting organizations (SSOs) often recommend or require that their members
declare

which of their patents are or may be essential to a standard that the SSO is considering or has
adopted, and to commit to license any such patents on FRAND terms. SSOs usually leave these
terms undefined, however, and in some recent cases courts have had to determine FRAND
royalties for specific SEPs.
114 Additional complications, not germane to the present discussion, may arise if the next-best
alternative to the infringed technology was also subject to (someone's) patent. On one view,
damages should be calculated based on the value of the infringed technology over the next-best
public domain technology only; on another, damages should reflect only the net advantage of the
infringed technology over the advantage that would have resulted from using (and, if necessary,
licensing) the next-best alternative, patented or not. For discussion, see Siebrasse & Cotter, Value,
supra note 60, at 1191-92, 1222-24.
115 In most countries, including the United States, an invention is sufficiently useful to satisfy patent
law's utility requirement as long as it works; it doesn't have to work better than other alternatives.
116 Alternatively, if the infringement enabled the defendant to make (say) fifty more sales (to
consumers who prize the patented invention X over alternative Y) than it would have made using
alternative Y, the patent owner should recover its lost profits on those fifty sales, assuming it can
show that it had sufficient capacity to meet that additional demand. Analogously, if the patent
owner is entitled under the patent-granting country's domestic law to recover the defendant's profit
attributable to the infringement, that profit should be only the net profit the defendant earned using
the infringing technology over and above what it would have earned using the next-best available
noninfringing alternative.
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infringement, and there is nothing to compensate (other than the royalty, if any, a
noninfringing defendant would have paid for the privilege of using X over Y). Put
yet another way, if (as I have argued elsewhere) the value of the patented invention
is the profit or cost advantage it enables a user to derive over the next-best
alternative, the value of our hypothetical invention X is (at most) the cost advantage
it enabled the defendant to accrue over public-domain technology Y. To award
anything more than that value overcompensates the patent owner for an invention
that may be functionally no better than the prior art.'17
U.S. courts have long understood and applied this reasoning in calculating lost
profits-and, until such awards were abolished in 1946, awards of infringer's
profits for non-design patents-though disputes sometimes arise over whether a
proposed alternative really was "available" to the defendant during the time period
at issue,"' or whether only unpatented alternatives should count.' 19 In the United
Kingdom and some other countries, by contrast, courts routinely disregard the
availability of noninfringing alternatives when calculating lost profits and awards of
the infringer's profits. 120 For the most part, these non-U.S. decisions seem (with all
due respect) simply not to grasp the economic logic as I've tried to express it
above. 12 1 As with the U.S. rule on disgorgement of profits for design infringement,
however, it's at least worth considering whether the U.K. rule could be justified as a
Refusing to consider evidence on the existence of noninfringing
heuristic.
alternatives certainly simplifies matters and (presumably) reduces the cost of
litigation. The obvious drawback is that this cost-reduction potentially comes at a
very steep price in terms of accuracy-though I've speculated in other work that
perhaps it hasn't mattered too much in practice, given the relatively small number
of cases in the U.K. (and other jurisdictions that follow United Horse-Shoe) in
which an award of lost profits or infringer's profits is actually litigated all the way
through to judgment (though one would expect it to have some impact on
settlement). 12 2 It's also possible that in some cases courts have applied other
117 For discussion, see, for example, CorrER, supra note 8, at 68.

See also Siebrasse & Cotter, Value,
supra note 60, at 1189 ("If the patentee can extract some part of the user's sunk costs, in addition
to the cost saving or profit increase provided by the patented technology, the incentive to invent
will be greater than the costs saving or profit advantage provided by the invention, and the patent
incentive will be too great.").

118 See, e.g., Grain Processing Corp. v. Am. Maize-Prods. Co., 185 F.3d 1341, 1349-50 (Fed. Cir.

1999).
119 See Cotter & Siebrasse, Value, supra note 60, at 1191-92.

120 The leading case in the U.K. is United Horse-Shoe & Nail Co. v. John Stewart & Co., (1888) L.R.
For discussion of other cases within the
13 App. Cas. 401 (appeal taken from Scot.).
Commonwealth (mostly) following United Horse-Shoe, see COTTER, supra note 8, at 187-93.
121 For discussion, see, for example, COTTER, supra note 8, at 68, 111-12. See also Norman V.
Siebrasse, "I Could Have Gone Down Metcalf Street Instead", SUFFICIENT DESCRIPTION BLOG,
http://www.sufficientdescription.com/2015/02/i-could-have-goneFeb. 1, 2015, available at
down-metcalfe-street.html (persuasively arguing that a recent Canadian case adhering to United
Horse-Shoe "turns on a failure to distinguish between the liability and damages determinations").
122 According to practitioners, for example, the vast majority of patent cases in the U.K. and Germany
are bifurcated, and most damages disputes settle prior to trial on damages-though the pace seems
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practices that tend to favor defendants and thus cancel out the overcompensatory
effect of ignoring alternatives. 123 Be that as it may, I doubt that many sober
economists would advocate disregarding noninfringing alternatives solely for the
cost-reducing effect of such a rule.
On the other hand, in some lost profits cases U.S. courts have applied
presumptions that seem almost as questionable (though perhaps with less potential
systemic impact). In Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 12 4 for example, the court
affirmed a lost profits award on lost sales of goods that competed with the
defendant's infringing products, based on the assumption that the plaintiffs goods
were covered by another valid patent or patents and thus that there were no
noninfringing alternatives available to the defendant. 125 Since the majority of
patents litigated to judgment are either invalid or not infringed, however, as an
empirical matter the opposite presumption might seem more apt-though, on the
other hand, all issued patents are presumed valid and thus arguably the burden of
establishing the invalidity of these other patents should rest (if anywhere) on the
defendant. 126
Second, in State Industries., Inc. v. Mor-Flo Industries., Inc., the court
awarded lost profits on a "market share" theory. 127 More specifically, the damages
award was premised on the assumption, that, but for the infringement, the defendant
would have exited the market and that the plaintiff and other competing firms would
have retained their relative market shares vis-d-vis one another. 12 8 One would
expect such a presumption often to be inaccurate. First, if the competitors' products
were noninfringing and not covered by other patents or intellectual property rights,
the defendant might have been able to retain all or most of its market share by
copying those products (thus suggesting that the plaintiff may have been entitled to
a lower award). Second, if on the other hand the defendant would have exited the
market absent the infringement, the plaintiff and its competitors would have seen
their relative shares of the remaining market go up, all other things being equal
(suggesting that the plaintiff may have been entitled to a higher award). Third,
however, if all other things weren 't equal, the plaintiffs market share vis-A-vis the
competitive fringe might have been either higher or lower than during the period of

123

124
125

126

127
128

to be picking up in the U.K. See Scott, supra note 76, at 273.
See COTTER, supra note 8, at 200-03 (discussing how in Celanese Int'l Corp. v. BP Chemicals
Ltd., [1999] R.P.C. 203 (Pat. Ct.) (Eng.), the court ultimately concluded that the infringing process
contributed very little to the profit earned on the defendant's products, and awarded only about
0.3% of what the plaintiff initially sought).
Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc).
See id. at 1548; see also id. at 1573 (Nies, J., dissenting in part) (noting that these patents "were
never asserted against Kelley, and the validity of those patents is untested").
The issue is somewhat analogous to that faced by courts in reverse-payment antitrust disputes,
where there is a widespread concern over not having to incur the cost of holding a patent validity
trial-within-a-trial. See FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2236-37 (2013).
State Indus., Inc. v. Mor-Flo Indus., Inc., 883 F.2d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
See id. at 1575-76.
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Given the possibly high cost of resolving these
the infringement.1 2 9
indeterminacies, though, perhaps the court was right not to require a more detailed
inquiry, particularly since the (possibly defendant-favoring) methodology the court
employed was suggested by the plaintiff itself.13 0
Third, the Federal Circuit has held that, in a market characterized by only two
suppliers, the trier of fact may infer that any sales made by the defendant would
have been made by the plaintiff;' 3 and in Integrated Technology Corp. v. Rudolph
Technologies, Inc. it extended this rule by permitting an inference of lost sales
notwithstanding evidence that the defendant could have competed by means of a
noninfringing alternative.132 This latter extension, at least, seems hard to justify as
long as noninfringing alternatives generally are not excluded for reasons of cost
reduction. As discussed above, if there was a noninfringing alternative, the
plaintiff s actual lost profit may have been zero.
2. Reasonable Royalties
a. The Georgia-Pacific factors
Courts also make extensive use of heuristics in calculating reasonable
royalties. In the United States, opinions commonly cite to the Georgia-Pacific
factors133 as guides for calculating reasonable royalties. One could conceive of the
fifteen Georgia-Pacificfactors in their entirety as a sort of heuristic for tabulating
an appropriate royalty-or alternatively, of the first fourteen factors as a heuristic
for deciding the overarching issue embodied in factor fifteen, namely the
"hypothetical bargain" that a willing licensor and licensee would have struck prior
129 See COTTER, supra note 8, at 112-13.
130 See State Indus., 883 F.2d at 1577-78.
131 For cases, see Blair & Cotter, supra note 57, at 12 n.47.
132 Integrated Tech. Corp. v. Rudolph Techs., Inc., 734 F.3d

1352 at 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2013). In the
interest of full disclosure, I should note that I consulted on Rudolph Technology's petition for
certiorari in the cited case.
133 I could list all fifteen factors here, but anyone reading this paper probably already is more familiar
with them than he or she would care to admit, so why take up space? Of the fifteen, the most
important Georgia-Pacific factors, in my view, are factor 2, "the rates paid by the licensee for the
use of other patents comparable to the patent in suit"; factors 8 through 10, all of which relate to
the value of the patented technology, in terms of its effect on the implementer's profit or cost, in
comparison with alternatives; factor 13, "the portion of the realizable profit that should be credited
to the invention as distinguished from non-patented elements, the manufacturing process, business
risks, or significant features or improvements added by the infringer"; and factor 15, "the amount
that a licensor (such as the patentee) and a licensee (such as the infringer) would have agreed upon
(at the time the infringement began) if both had been reasonably and voluntarily trying to reach an
agreement; that is, the amount which a prudent licensee-who desired, as a business proposition,
to obtain a license to manufacture and sell a particular article embodying the patented inventionwould have been willing to pay as a royalty and yet be able to make a reasonable profit and which
amount would have been acceptable by a prudent patentee who was willing to grant a license."
For readers who nonetheless feel compelled to access the complete list, the case that compiled
them and from which the preceding quotes are taken is Georgia-PacificCo. v. U.S. Plywood Co.,
318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), modified, 446 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1971).
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to the date on which the infringement began. Either way, however, an obvious
problem with allowing testimony on such a wide range of evidence is that, unless
the judge exerts very tight control over the presentation of evidence, a clever expert
could manipulate the factors to find support for virtually any damages amount. The
risk and range of potential error therefore would appear to be substantial, and the
potentially wide-ranging nature of the inquiry seems poorly constructed to control
costs. Thus, as a heuristic, the Georgia-Pacificfactors leave much to be desiredthough some recent proposals to collapse the relevant inquiry into a smaller number
of economically relevant factors appear to have promise. 134
b. Comparable licenses
Of the various Georgia-Pacificheuristics, one that often is the focal point of
disputes is the consideration of "comparable" licenses.' 35 Logically, the terms of
other licenses offered by the patent owner for the patent in suit (or by the patent
owner or others for closely similar technology) might be helpful for reconstructing
the terms of the license to which the owner and the accused infringer would have
agreed, but for the infringement, as well as for estimating the objective value of the
technology in suit. Nevertheless, there are some obvious limits to comparable
licenses as accurate guides to adjudicated royalties. First, although U.S. law would
generally require a patent plaintiff to disclose to the other party any relevant
licenses it previously has granted, other patent licenses generally are confidential
and thus not publicly accessible-which poses risks that the "comparable" licenses
134

See, e.g., FED.

CIRCUIT BAR Ass'N, MODEL PATENT JURY INSTRUCTIONS (Jan. 2016) (proposing
that
courts instruct juries that they "should consider all the facts known and available to the parties at
the time the infringement began," but that "[s]ome of the kinds of factors that you may consider in
making your determination are: (1) The value that the claimed invention contributes to the accused
product. (2) The value that factors other than the claimed invention contribute to [the accused
product]. (3) Comparable license agreements, such as those covering the use of the claimed
invention or similar technology"); Daralyn J. Durie & Mark A. Lemley, A StructuredApproach to
Calculating Reasonable Royalties, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 627 (2010) (arguing that the
Georgia-Pacific mostly "boil down to three fundamental questions: (1) what is the marginal
contribution of the patented invention over the prior art?; (2) how many other inputs were
necessary to achieve that contribution, and what is their relative value?; and (3) is there some
concrete evidence suggesting that the market has chosen a number different than the product of (1)
and (2)?"); cf Kysar et al., supra note 4, at 134 (observing that, "in light of. . . process values, we
may be forced as a practical matter to keep legal tests that employ cumbersome amalgams of
factors, while relying on the heuristics research methodology to 'excavate' the real factors and

weights that end up being used by judicial actors within the seemingly unpredictable balancing
13

tests").
Somewhat analogous is the use in other countries of what are perceived to be industry norms for
licensing rates for various technologies. As I have noted previously, "courts in Germany
sometimes consult awards made in arbitration decisions involving employee inventor
compensation for guidance in determining royalty rates, and courts in Japan sometimes consult
standard rates for various technologies as reported by surveys conducted by the Japanese Institute
of Inventors and Innovation (Hatsumei Kyokai)." Cotter & Golden, supra note 52 (manuscript at
23 n.34) (citing COTTER, supra note 8, at 269, 311 & n.100, 328). Just how accurate these
heuristics are in estimating the bargain the parties themselves would have reached, if that is the
intended goal, is not clear to me.
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on which experts base their opinions may not be representative of the whole. 136
Second, the terms the patentee negotiated with one party may not be similar to the
terms it would have negotiated with the infringer, but for the infringement-and
thus to the extent that the trier of fact is susceptible to the "representativeness
heuristic," it may accord these existing licenses undue weight. Unless the patent
owner is subject to an obligation to offer the patent on identical terms to everyone,
for example-which is one, but not the only, interpretation of the
"nondiscriminatory" portion of the FRAND commitment that encumbers some
SEPs-there is no particular reason to expect the patent owner to agree to similar
terms with licensees whose expected uses of the technology may be very
different.1 3 7 Two recurring settings in which courts recognize this potential for
diverging rates are when the proposed comparables are in settlement of litigation, in
which case courts often have excluded them,'3 8 or are licenses offered by patent
pools (which may have to be adjusted, as discussed below).1 3 9 A related problem
arises in connection with the use of portfolio licenses as comparables, since
portfolio licenses by definition encompass many patents, while the reasonable
royalty to be determined in litigation by definition encompasses only the single
patent or small number of patents in suit. I return to this problem below in the
context of SEPs, though the problem is not limited to that context.
A third potential problem with the use of comparables to determine reasonable
royalties is circularity, since comparables themselves presumably are negotiated
based on the parties' sense of what the parties expect a court would award if the

136 See Jorge L. Contreras et al., Study Proposal-CommercialPatent Licensing Data (Univ. of Utah
Coll. of Law, Research Paper No. 164; Minn. Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 16-25, 2016),

http://papers.ssrn.com/abstractid=2755706.

137 See, e.g., Erik Hovenkamp & Jonathan Masur, Reliable Problems from Unreliable Patent
Damages (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (manuscript at 7-14). Moreover, where
the patent owner has voluntarily granted only exclusive licenses, logically the appropriate
monetary recovery is the exclusive licensees' lost profits. See Mark A. Lemley, Distinguishing
Lost Profitsfrom Reasonable Royalties, 51 WM. & MARY L. REv. 655, 673 & n.82 (2009).
138 See, e.g., Wordtech Sys., Inc. v. Integrated Networks Sols., Inc., 609 F.3d 1308, 1320-21 (Fed. Cir.
2010). One rationale for treating licenses negotiated in settlement of litigation with suspicion is
that these licenses will reflect (to some degree) the defendant's willingness to pay in order to avoid
not only further litigation costs but also the additional holdup costs that may result from having to
switch technologies. See, e.g., William F. Lee & A. Douglas Melamed, Breaking the Vicious
Cycle of PatentDamages, 101 CORNELL L. REv. 385, 418 (2016). On the other hand, as Jonathan
Masur argues, settlement licenses may be more likely to reflect a high probability of validity and
infringement, which (for reasons discussed infra at notes 144-50 and accompanying text) would
tend to make such licenses more accurate as guideposts for estimating a reasonable royalty. See
Jonathan S. Masur, The Use and Misuse of Patent Licenses, 110 Nw. U.L. REv. 115, 145-48
(2015). Durie and Lemley have also noted that some settlement licenses could show that the
patented technology was worth less than what the patentee is demanding. See Durie & Lemley,
supra note 134, at 642-43. And in one recent case, the Federal Circuit has expressed a greater
willingness to allow damages awards to be based on settlement agreements, under appropriate
circumstances. See Prism Techs. LLC v. Sprint Spectrum L.P., 849 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2017)
139 See infra text accompanying notes 189-91.
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matter proceeded to litigation.140 Whether this circularity problem systematically
over- or under-rewards patent owners is a matter of some debate, however. On one
view, even if jury awards are on average correct, patent owners will be
systematically undercompensated because infringers will opt for litigation when
patent value is higher than the average award and for licensing when it is lower.1 4 1
By contrast, Erik Hovenkamp has argued that comparables often may be
overcompensatory, because patent owners may be reluctant to license for an
(accurately low) royalty that later could be used against them in litigation. 14 2 For
what it's worth, there is some evidence that this is what happened with regard to
Motorola's license with VTech, as discussed in Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc.1 43
Fourth, according to Jonathan Masur, despite the fact that the hypothetical ex
ante bargain presumes (as it should) that the parties bargained in the belief that the
patent in suit was valid and infringed,'" courts generally are "resistant to using a
standard multiplier on the ground that it lacks a connection to the case at bar." 4 5
Given the empirical evidence that U.S. patent owners prevail in somewhere between
a quarter and a third of all infringement actions resulting in a final judgment,1 46 such
resistance might seem misplaced (though understandable in light of recent Federal
Circuit case law, discussed below, precluding experts from using certain general
assumptions absent evidence of a close fit between those assumptions and the
specific facts of the case).1 4 7 Applying a standard (three- or four-time) multiplier to
the royalty rate negotiated in a comparable license therefore might appear on
average to improve accuracy, whereas not permitting any increase in effect amounts
to a presumption that the comparable was negotiated with knowledge that the patent
140

See, e.g., Lee & Melamed, supra note 138, at 418-20; Masur, supra note 138, at 121; Mark A.

Lemley & Carl Shapiro, PatentHoldup and Royalty Stacking, 85

TEX.

L. REv. 1991, 2021 (2007).

141 But see supra note 52 (critiquing this argument).
142

See Erik Hovenkamp, How Reasonable Royalties Suppress Patent Licensing (May 18, 2015),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstractid=2607678; see also Lee & Melamed, supra note
138, at 418 (stating that "[platent holders, knowing that their licenses will influence royalty awards
in future litigation, have an incentive to structure their agreements in ways that exaggerate the
apparent cost of the licenses to the licensees.").

143

Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., Case No. C1O-1823JLR, 2013 WL 2111217, at *67 (W.D.
Wash. Apr. 25, 2013), aff'd, 795 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2015). 1 thank Norman Siebrasse for calling
this specific matter to my attention.

44 See supra text accompanying note 59.
145 Masur, supra note 138, at 152 (citing Avocent Redmond Corp. v. Rose Elecs., No. C06-171 1RSL,

2013 WL 8844098, at *4-5 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 11, 2013)). But see St. Lawrence Comm'ns LLC v.
ZTE Corp., Case No. 2:15-cv-349-JRG (E.D. Tex. Feb. 21 2017) (permitting an expert to offer an
opinion that the royalty rate the plaintiff had negotiated with Samsung for the use of the patents in
suit should be increased by 50% to reflect a "settlement discount" and 18% to account for an

"invalidity discount").
1 See CHRis BARRY ET AL., PwC 2016 PATENT LITIGATION STUDY: ARE WE AT AN INFLECTION POINT?

14-15 (reporting patent owners' overall success rate from 1995-2016 as "approximately 33%");
John R. Allison et al., Understandingthe Realities of Modern PatentLitigation, 92 TEX. L. REv.

1769, 1793-94 (2014) (reporting that, for 2008-2009, patentees won 26% of suits overall and 61%
147

of cases that went to trial).
See infra notes 153-60 and accompanying text.
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was valid and infringed by the other party to the comparable.1 4 8 Notice, however,
that whichever way the court decides it is effectively applying a presumptioneither that the parties to the comparable negotiated under conditions of uncertainty
with regard to validity and infringement, or that they did not-and that either way
the presumption is likely to go unrebutted. Under the current approach as described
by Masur, the burden would be on the patent owner to offer evidence of the
perceived pre-litigation vulnerability of its own patent, while if we presume that the
comparable reflects (say) a 75% discount the burden would be on the infringer to
show that both parties to the comparable believed the patent very likely was valid
and infringed.1 49 In either case, the risk of introducing such evidence to the party
bearing the burden of production may well outweigh the benefit, and the
presumption will go unrebutted. This suggests that, from the standpoint of accuracy
alone, a standard increase of three to four times the negotiated rate might be worth
considering-unless, pace Hovenkamp, comparables are already likely to be
inflated due to strategic bargaining.15 0
c. Profit splits
One class of heuristics that the Federal Circuit has come to disfavor in recent
years involves assumptions about how the bargaining parties would have agreed to
split the benefits the implementer derived or expected to derive from the use of the
patented technology. Most notable was the court's rejection, noted above, of the
"Rule of Thumb" permitting experts to base their damages estimates on the premise
that patent licensors generally expect to share 25% of the profit derived from the
sale of a product embodying the patented invention. 1 5 As I've discussed before
148

On the other hand, as several coauthors and I have cautioned in another recent paper, the use of
such a standard multiplier might give rise to a circularity problem, because
[a] standard multiplier will overcompensate patentees with strong patents.
Anticipating this, parties bargaining in the shadow of the expected trial outcome
will negotiate a royalty based on the inflated damages value, and that inflated
royalty will feed back into future awards, and so on. This would result in effect in
a new source of holdup which would allow a patentee with a strong patent to
extract more than the value of its invention. The same spiral would happen in the
other direction with patents that are weaker than average.

149

Thomas F. Cotter et al., ReasonableRoyalty Damagesfor Complex Products (manuscript at 37-38)
(unpublished paper, on file with author).
See Masur, supra note 138, at 150-51.

150 See supra text accompanying note 142; see also Masur, supra note 138, at 152-56 (showing how

standard multipliers might exacerbate the circularity effect).
'

See Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Courts in some other
parts of the world have continued to use versions of the Rule of Thumb. See COTTER, supra note
8, at 195, 269 n.185; Thomas F. Cotter, Nestler and Hellebrand Square Off on Rules of Thumb,
COMP.
PAT.
REMEDIES
BLOG
Jan.
12,
2015
4:23AM),
http://comparativepatentremedies.blogspot.com/2015/01/nestler-and-hellebrandt-square-offon.html; Thomas F. Cotter, French Court Applies 25% Rule of Thumb, Multiplier to Arrive at 3%
Royalty,
COMP.
PAT.
REMEDIES
BLOG,
(Apr.
23,
2015
9:22AM),
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(and as others have explained in much greater depth) this 25% Rule was based on a
small, unrepresentative sample of firms. Moreover, by taking as its starting
assumption that the parties would agree to split 25% of the profit from sales of the
infringing product-not 25% of the profits derivedfrom the use of the patent-the
rule didn't make much economic sense for products embodying more than just a
couple of patents. 152

But the intuition that rational parties might agree in some fashion to split the
expected or actual benefits from the use isn't crazy. Indeed, it's a central
assumption of most economic bargaining models-including the famous Nash
Bargaining construct, under which (to simplify a bit) the expert begins with the
assumption that bargaining parties generally would agree to a 50-50 split of the
profits attributable to the use of the invention at issue. Nevertheless, in VirnetX,
Inc. v. Cisco Systems, the Federal Circuit disapproved of the use of the Nash
Bargaining construct on the ground that using a 50-50 split as the proposed starting
point for a damages calculation was "insufficiently tied to the facts of the case."13
The court had expressed the same misgiving about methodology not being "tied" to
the facts in Uniloc,15 4 but the two cases arguably are quite different. The principal
problem with the 25% Rule of Thumb as applied prior to Uniloc was that the
assumption of a 25% split of the entire profit had little empirical or theoretical
support and predictably would lead to inflated royalties, particularly if juries
(subject, as they may be, to anchoring bias) were aware that the entire profit was
enormous. Nash Bargaining, by contrast, is a standard methodological tool within
game theory-as well as being, at an abstract level at least, consistent with common
sense and experience-and would be less susceptible to misuse as long as the
relevant profit to be split is the profit attributable to the use of the patented
invention, not the entire profit derived from sales of what is often a multipatented
device.155
http://comparativepatentremedies.blogspot.com/2015/04/french-court-applies-25-rule-ofthumb_23.html. The Federal Circuit's rejection of the 25% Rule is a counterexample to the trend
noted in the Introduction of that court's embrace of bright (or brightish) line rules in other
contexts-which rules the Supreme Court has proven apt to strike down as being unduly rigid, as
in the willfulness and attorneys' fees contexts. See supra text accompanying notes 80-81, 98.
152 See COTER, supra note 8, at 137-39 (discussing critiques); Thomas F. Cotter, Four Principlesfor
CalculatingReasonable Royalties in Patent Infringement Litigation, 27 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER
& HIGH TECH. L.J. 725, 754-57 (2011) (same).
153 VimetX, Inc. v. Cisco Systems, 767 F.3d 1308, 1314-34 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
154 See Uniloc, 632 F.3d at 1315 (characterizing the 25% rule as "a fundamentally flawed tool for
determining a baseline royalty rate in a hypothetical negotiation" and holding that "[e]vidence
relying on the 25 percent rule of thumb is thus inadmissible under Daubert and the Federal Rules
of Evidence, because it fails to tie a reasonable royalty base to the facts of the case at issue.").
1 The use of a rebuttable presumption that the parties would have agreed to split the profit
attributable to the defendant's use of the patented invention (over and above what it would have
earned from the next-best available noninfringing alternative) also would seem consistent with
experimental evidence suggesting that people in Western societies generally find an even division
of benefits to be fair. See, e.g., HENRICH, supra note 1, at 358-59 (discussing the ultimatum game);
LYNN STOUT, CULTFVATING CONSCIENCE: How GOOD LAWS MAKE GOOD PEOPLE 86-88 (2011)
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Doctrinally, the court's "tying" objection is based on its reading of the Federal
Rules of Evidence and governing Supreme Court case law on the admissibility of
expert testimony. 156 But the text of Federal Rule of Evidence 702 doesn't
necessarily require, in the present context, proof that the parties themselves would
have agreed to a 50% split; all it states is that "A witness who is qualified as an
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the
form of an opinion or otherwise if: (a) the expert's scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue; (b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; (c)
the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and (d) the expert
has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case." 1 57
Moreover, the three Supreme Court cases on which the current text of the rule is
based, which the Federal Circuit cited in Uniloc, all involved questionable
applications of specialized expertise to determine whether the plaintiffs' injuries
were caused by the defendants. Because these applications were not closely tied to
the facts surrounding the genesis of those specific injuries, the testimony was not
"helpful" to the trier of fact.158
In the present context, by contrast, as we have seen the issue is not whether the
plaintiff suffered any injury caused by the defendant's conduct-that much, rightly
or wrongly, is presumed-but rather the quantification of that injury; and the
premise that the parties would have agreed to quantify that loss by dividing the
surplus in some fashion, had the defendant not infringed, seems unremarkable. The
only remaining question is whether the expert may assume a 50-50 split as the
starting point of her analysis, to be adjusted up or down based on other relevant
factors; or whether instead she must substantiate the 50-50 (or other) split with
party-specific evidence. But since the parties didn't actually negotiate anythingthe defendant infringed, after all-any such effort at substantiation may be equally
speculative. Indeed, the outcome of cases like VirnetX might be to exclude
testimony that (on average) not only would be less costly to obtain, but also would
be more likely to increase accuracy, than other alternatives such as comparablesthe latter often being an unappetizing choice, given their many potential defects as
described above.
(similar).
156

This is more apparent from Uniloc than from VirnetX, which merely cites to Uniloc for the
proposition that the proposed methodology must be sufficiently "tied" to the facts. See VirnetX,
767 F.3d at 1333-34. Uniloc cites to the Supreme Court case law that is now reflected in FED. R.
EvID. 702.

157 FED. R. EVID. 702.

158 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 591 (1993) (citing United States v.

Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1242 (3d Cir. 1985), for the proposition that it is an "aspect of
relevancy ... whether expert testimony proffered in the case is sufficiently tied to the facts of the
case that it will aid the jury in resolving a factual dispute."); Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526

U.S. 137, 153-54 (1999); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 142-47 (1997) (affirming
exclusion of expert testimony on causation given the "analytical gap between the data and the
opinion proffered").
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Put another way, once we accept that dividing the surplus between the parties
would be a rational way to calculate a royalty, the question is whether one should
start with no assumption regarding the split to which the parties would have agreed,
or alternatively with a prior assumption that can, in Bayesian fashion, subsequently
be altered in light of additional evidence. Under the current rule, the burden is on
the proponent to come forward with evidence as to the specific split the parties
would have agreed to; but while such evidence may be available in some cases," 9 if
it is not a 50-50 split would seem as reasonable an assumption as any. Moreover, as
long as a 50-50 split is used only as a starting point, either party would still be able
to refute the presumption if it has access to competent counterevidence that the
parties would have agreed to a different division. Precluding the use of a 50-50
presumption thus seems, at best, to undervalue the potential benefits of the
presumption as a heuristic, and at worst to risk reducing (rather than improving) the
odds of accurate calculation.1 6 0
d. Royalty bases
Heuristics also play a role when, rather than awarding a lump-sum reasonable
royalty, a court awards a "running" royalty consisting of a royalty rate multiplied by
a royalty base. Typically, the base is (some portion of) the revenue the infringer
earned from sales of products incorporating the patented invention. In a series of
recent decisions, the Federal Circuit has held that, as a general matter, the base
1

See Christof Binder & Anke Nestler, Valuation Of Intangibles And Trademarks-A Rehabilitation
Of The Profit-Split Method After Uniloc, LES NOUVELLES (May 2016 https://www.lesi.org/lesnouvelles/les-nouvelles-article-of-the-month (arguing that data from purchase accounting, "the
process of classifying, valuing and accounting for all of the assets and liabilities that are included
in the acquisition of a business," can be useful in inferring typical profit splits in specific
industries); Scott, supra note 76, at 276 (stating that in the absence of comparable licenses English
courts will consider how much profit the defendant actually made, on the assumption "that the
parties would have accurately predicted this figure and based their negotiations on determining the
split of those available profits," with the actual split "likely to depend upon how profits tend to be
split in that industry and the division of work between the licensee and licensor."); see also supra
note 135 (noting the use of industry norms in Germany and Japan). Further empirical study of
typical splits or royalty rates in specific industries would be helpful.
16( For a related critique of the Uniloc court's rejection of the 25% Rule, see 5 DAvID L. FAIGMAN ET
AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: TH-E LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY

§ 43:9,

at 885

(2015-16 ed.):
While the Uniloc court's reasoning appears merely to mirror longstanding Daubert
principles about the fit between expert testimony and the facts of the case, the
realities are more complicated. For one thing, the court took a rather extreme
position that the expert's use of the 25 percent rule as a starting point was
illegitimate, even though he might then depart using case-specific facts. Since the
royalty calculations are based on a hypothetical negotiation, an expert needs to
start somewhere.
For reasons stated in the text above, although I agree with the court's rejection of the 25% Rule,
Faigman et al.'s point about needing a starting point rings true, and to my mind suggests that the
court's further extension of Uniloc to the Nash Bargaining framework goes too far.
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should not be the "entire market value"-that is, 100%, of the revenue earned from
sales of infringing products-unless "the patented feature drives the demand for an
entire multi-component product."l61 Instead, the expert should begin with the
assumption that the correct base is the "smallest salable patent-practicing unit"
(SSPPU),1 6 2 and then if necessary make further adjustments to account for the fact
that the patent in suit may be only one of several patents or features embodied in
that unit. 163 The rationale for the SSPPU rule is twofold: first, as a "substantive
legal rule" that "the ultimate combination of royalty base and royalty rate must
reflect the value attributable to the infringing features of the product, and no
more";'64 and second, as an "evidentiary principle" intended to avoid "skew[ing] the
damages horizon for the jury" by "mak[ing] a patentee's proffered damages amount
appear modest by comparison."1 65 The SSPPU rule therefore functions as a legal
heuristic, by imposing a (rebuttable) presumption against the use of the entire
market value (EMV) as the base, and also reflects the court's concern over juries'
improper use of the anchoring heuristic.
Whether the SSPPU rule actually improves the accuracy of damages
calculations is debatable. Multiplication is commutative, after all, so (as the Federal
Circuit itself has recognized) one could arrive at the same royalty by multiplying a
large base by a minute rate or by multiplying a small base by a correspondingly
large rate.' 66 Moreover, experience suggests that (for convenience or other reasons)
parties to real-world licensing transactions often do use the EMV as the royalty

base.1 6 7 This could pose a quandary if a negotiated license using the EMV
happened to be the most directly relevant comparable, since excluding it from
consideration might deprive the trier of fact of the best available evidence from
which to estimate the royalty due the patent owner. In recognition of this potential
problem, the court in Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Systems, Inc. held that an expert may
rely on such licenses as comparables as long as she "explains to the jury the need to
discount reliance on a given license to account only for the value attributed to the

161

162

LaserDynamics, Inc. v. Quanta Comp., Inc., 694 F.3d 51, 67 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Cornell
Univ. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 609 F. Supp. 2d 279, 283 (N.D.N.Y. 2009)).
id

163

See VirnetX, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 767 F.3d 1308, 1327-28 (Fed. Cir. 2014).

16

Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., 773 F.3d 1201, 1226 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (citing VirnetX, 767 F.3d

165
166

at 1326). For an argument against placing too strict a burden on the patent owner on the issue of
apportionment, however, see Golden, supra note 5, at 585 (arguing that the "infringer seems likely
to be the best potential source of knowledge about how the value of a patented invention compares
to the overall value of the infringer's product or process," and that "to the extent courts demand
information on apportionment, they should not place too stringent a burden on the patentee as
opposed to the adjudged infringer.").
Ericsson, 773 F.3d at 1226-27 (quoting LaserDynamics,694 F.3d at 68).
See Ericsson, 773 F.3d at 1226; Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1333-39

(Fed. Cir. 2009).

167 See, e.g., Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1339; Colleen Chien & Eric Shulman, Patent Semi-comparables, 25

- TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 215, 220 (2018); Thomas F. Cotter, Patent Holdup, Patent Remedies, and
Antitrust Responses, 34 J. CORP. L. 1151, 1186 n. 164 (2009) (citing additional sources).
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licensed technology," and that the district court should provide a cautionary
instruction upon request.' 68 In addition, in the subsequent CSIRO decision the court
approved an expert's use of the EMV as the royalty base where this mirrored the
parties' own (ultimately unsuccessful) licensing negotiations. 169 CSIRO also
happened to be a bench trial; and while this matter did not explicitly factor in to the
court's analysis perhaps there need be fewer concerns over potential misuse of the
anchoring heuristic in a case tried to a professional judge, rather than to a lay
jury.170 (For what it's worth, judges often do use the EMV as the royalty base in
Japan, Germany, and other countries where juries are never called upon to decide
patent cases.' 7 1 ) On the other hand, some commentators have questioned whether it
makes sense to assume, as the SSPPU rule arguably does, that juries are less likely
to heed a cautionary instruction on apportioning royalties than they are in following
instructions regarding other complex matters which, for better or worse, our legal
system entrusts them to adjudicate.1 72
Be that as it may, the IEEE last year adopted a policy requiring members to use
the SSPPU as the base for FRAND royalties. 173 Although the next section of this

168 See Ericsson, 773 F.3d at 1228.
169

See Commonwealth Sci. & Indus. Research Org. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 809 F.3d 1295, 1301-04 (Fed.
Cir. 2015) [hereinafter CSIRO].
Though perhaps not:

according to some studies, judges too sometimes are unconsciously
motivated by irrelevant factors. In what is perhaps the most prominent recent example, Danziger
et al. reported that in a study of 1,112 judicial rulings by Israeli judges, the likelihood of a
favorable parole ruling was "greater at the very beginning of the work day or after a food break
than later in the sequence of cases." Shai Danziger et al., Extraneous Factors in Judicial
Decisions, 108 PROC. NAT'L AcAD. Sci. 6889, 6890 (2011). And there's no obvious reason why
one should expect judges, any more than the rest of us, to be immune to overconfidence bias, see
supra note 32, which in turn may explain why some courts prefer the use of multifactor tests which
(in theory, if not in practice) promise greater accuracy than do relatively simple rules. See also
MERCIER & SPERBER, supra note 1, at 271 (stating that "judges, however competent, have a myside
bias, using their erudition to defend preconceived opinions rather than arrive at an impartial
verdict," whereas jury "deliberation has the potential to compensate for each juror's biases").
171 See Schdnknecht, supra note 76, at 322-24 (discussing German law); Thomas F. Cotter, A Study of
Reasonable Royalty Awards in Japan, COMP. PAT. REMEDIEs BLOG (Mar. 23, 2016 4:26AM),
http://comparativepatentremedies.blogspot.com/2015/03/a-study-of-reasonable-royalty-awardsin.html (discussing Second Subcommittee of the Second Patent Committee, Predictability of
Monetary Damages under Article 102(3) of the JapanesePatent Law, 64 INTELL. PROP. MGT. 219
17

(2014)).
172 See J. Gregory Sidak, The Proper Royalty Base for Patent Damages, 10 J. COMP. L. & ECON. 989,
1022-24 (2014) (arguing that because "individuals are typically averse to extreme results," it is
"equally plausible that juries would adopt a cautious approach when awarding damages for patent
infringement and thus undercompensate the patent holder.").
173 See Institute of Electric and Electronics Engineers Standards Association (IEEE-SA) Standards
Bylaws
Board
6.1
[hereinafter
IEEE
Bylaws],
available
at
http://standards.ieee.org/develop/policies/bylaws/sb bylaws.pdf (stating that the determination of a
"reasonable rate" "should include, but need not be limited to, the consideration of: The value that
the functionality of the claimed invention or inventive feature within the Essential Patent Claim
contributes to the value of the relevant functionality of the smallest saleable Compliant
Implementation that practices the Essential Patent Claim[;] The value that the Essential Patent
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paper discusses FRAND royalties in more depth, I note the matter here because
adoption of this new policy has provoked considerable academic discussion of the
question whether, even aside from possible anchoring concerns, the SSPPU rule is
likely to increase or decrease the accuracy of royalty and damages calculations.
Resolution of the issue depends in part on how one defines "accuracy." As many
observers (including me) have observed, a patent's value to the user increases when
that patent is integrated with other complementary technologies; 174 and if one
believes (as I do,' 7 5 though there are many who would disagree) that the owner
should capture some portion of this increased value, then use of the SSPPU can be
problematic. To illustrate, in a recent article Nicolas Petit discusses a hypothetical
aircraft manufacturer that replaces most of its aircraft's electrical wiring with
wireless technology, which is compliant with the Wireless Avionics
IntraCommunications (WAIC) standard and which uses a portfolio of patents
owned by a single patent owner. In his example, although the SSPPU consists of
"Radio Frequency ('RF') equipment, ie antennas, transmitters, and receivers"
costing about $1,000, the cost savings attributable to the replacement amounts to
$3.02 million per aircraft.1 7 6 Using the SSPPU as the base, however, the royalty
rate the patent owner would demand to capture even half of the projected cost
77
If
savings from the use of its patents would be 1510%, which seems unrealistic.
the base was instead the cost of an aircraft ($414.4 million in Petit's hypothetical),
the royalty would be only 0.36%, but this would run afoul of the SSPPU. Of
course, in the real world it's unlikely that one single patent owner would own all of
the relevant patents reading on a standard, so perhaps one could employ the SSPPU
rule and still come up with a per-patent royalty that would not exceed the value of
the SSPPU itself though in Petit's example, there would have to be 30,200 patents
for the per-patent rate to amount to only 5% of the value of the SSPPU. Based on
this analysis, Petit argues that SSPPU "is likely to reduce investment in socially
beneficial activities, including" general purpose "enabling" technologies that "yield
countless positive production externalities." 7 8 Again, though, if one starts from the
premise that innovation policy requires that the patent owner not benefit from the

Claim contributes to the smallest saleable Compliant Implementation that practices that claim, in

174

light of the value contributed by all Essential Patent Claims for the same IEEE Standard practiced
in that Compliant Implementation . . .. ").
See, e.g., Siebrasse & Cotter, Value, supra note 60.

'

See id

176

See Nicolas Petit, The Smallest Salable Patent-PracticingUnit ("SSPPU") Experiment, General
Purpose Technologies and the Coase Theorem, SSRN at 3 (Feb. 18, 2016), available at
See also Anne Layne-Farrar, The
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2734245.
Patent Damages Gap: An Economist's Review of U.S. Patent Damages Apportionment Rules,
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstractid=2911289 (Apr. 8, 2017) (arguing that courts should focus on the
value of the use to the defendant, rather than on the location of the technology within a particular
component).
Petit proposes a rate of 3020%, id. at 4, but this assumes (unrealistically, in my view) that the
patent owner would extract the entire surplus.
Id. at 5, 8.

1n

8
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increased value to the user resulting from complementarity, the SSPPU corrects for
what otherwise might be a serious risk of overcompensation. 179
On the other hand, and in addition to the above considerations, Richard Stem
has argued that use of a larger base necessarily entails a greater risk of error for yet
another reason rooted in people's cognitive limitations:
[C]onsider a $1 chip in a $500 smartphone. Suppose the invention contributes 10% of the
value of the chip and that the reasonable royalty is half of that or 5 cents, ie., 5% of the $1
chip price. In principle, the reasonable royalty based on the smartphone price would be
the same 5 cents or 0.02% of $500. But how is a jury or judge to determine the difference
between a royalty of 0.02% and 0.01% or even 0.1%? Yet the cash value of the error is
multiplied greatly by starting out with an inflated royalty base. Choosing between
infinitesimals is an inherently error-prone exercise. 18 0

Actually, if the royalty in Stem's example is supposed to come to $0.05 per chip or
per phone, the per-phone royalty would be 0.01%, not 0.02%, though this doesn't
affect Stem's broader point: perhaps the trier of fact is more likely to confuse 0.0 1%
with 0.02% than to confuse 5% with 10%, so that errors will be more common
when the EMV is used as the base. Worse yet, the errors may be more likely to
favor patent owners (than to cancel out), if as the Federal Circuit assumes revealing
the EMV to the jury will "skew" its "damages horizon" upwards rather than down.
On balance, though, although the cognitive biases that advocates of the SSPPU
invoke may be well-documented in many settings, whether they are likely to affect
the calculation of damages within the formal setting of a trial remains a hypothesis,
not a proven fact.' 8 ' Moreover, the fact that many real-world transactions employ
the EMV as a base would incline me to permit its use in litigation as well until there
is stronger evidence tying the general cognitive biases identified above to the
specific context of damages calculations at trial. That said, if one believes that
patent owners are not entitled to recover any portion of the value attributable to
complementarity, abandoning the SSPPU would pose a serious risk of
overcompensation. Ultimately, then, the resolution of this particular issue may
depend more on one's view of what value the patent owner should be able to
recover, than on the various ways in which cognitive heuristics may affect damages
calculation.

Petit argues, however, that even aside from points discussed above the SSPPU may raise
transaction costs for a variety of reasons, see id at 5-7, an observation that would appear to explain
why in the real world parties often use the end value of the product as the base.
180 Richard H. Stem, What Are Reasonable and Non-DiscriminatoryTerms for Licensing a StandardEssentialPatent?, 37 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 549, 554 n.26 (2015).
18' So here's an example where a lab experiment, see supra note 17, might be quite helpful. Cf John
79

Campbell et al., Countering the Plaintiffs Anchor: Jury Simulations to Evaluate Damages
Arguments, 101 IOWA L. REv. 543 (2016) (citing studies concluding that, in personal injury cases,
juries are influenced by the damages figure proposed by plaintiffs' counsel, independent of the
evidence presented, and discussing experiments designed to test the effect of defense responses).
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3. FRAND Royalties
A final setting in which courts have begun to consider various heuristics
involves the calculation of FRAND royalties. As noted above, in recent years
courts in the U.S. and elsewhere have sometimes had to determine whether a
particular licensing offer or counteroffer was on FRAND terms, and what the actual
amount of FRAND royalty would be;' 8 2 and as one might imagine, these questions
can be quite difficult to answer. At a theoretical level, courts and commentators
have expressed differing views on such matters as whether a FRAND royalty
should be equal to or lower than the reasonable royalty that would be due for the
infringement of the same patent absent the FRAND commitment; whether, as
alluded to above,' 8 3 the owner should derive any portion of the value attributable to
complementarity or network effects; and (relatedly) whether the ideal royalty
should reflect the value of the patent ex ante in light of both unpatented and
patented alternatives. Further, even if one could put these areas of contention aside,
the fact that many complex products embody hundreds or thousands of patented
features means that any patent infringement case (not just FRAND cases) in which
the trier of fact is called upon to calculate the damages owed for the infringement of
just one or a small number of these patents will encounter many complicated
practical questions, among them how to apportion value among what may be
hundreds or thousands of patents, and how to estimate value if there are no
comparable licenses covering only the patents in suit-a common problem, given
that many SEPs are licensed as part of a broader, often global, portfolio. The
question therefore arises whether there are any possible heuristics that courts could
employ to resolve these issues well enough at acceptable cost, or at least to shift the
burden to the party who is better able to produce the evidence needed for a more
finely-tuned calculation.
One possibility-clearly the least costly to implement-would be to apply the
principle sometimes referred to as "numeric proportionality," and assume that each
of the SEPs relevant to a given standard is entitled to precisely the same royalty.
Some commentators have endorsed this approach' 84 -and indeed there may be
cases where attempting to estimate the value of individual patents simply would be

182

For a discussion of the case law to date, see Norman V. Siebrasse & Thomas F. Cotter, Judicially
Determined FRAND Royalties, in 1 THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF TECHNICAL STANDARDIZATION

LAW (Jorge L. Contreras ed., forthcoming 2017).

183 See supratext accompanying notes 174-75.
184 See Philippe Chappatte, FRAND Commitments: The Case for Antitrust Intervention, 5 EuRO.
COMP. J. 319, 341 (2009) (stating that, while numeric proportionality "is a crude method, it is the
only practical method for assessing relative contribution when a large number of patents need to be
evaluated," though "[a]ppropriate adjustments should .. . be made to reflect, for example, that a
number of the patents in the portfolio may be about to expire or be limited in certain territories.");
Jorge L. Contreras, Fixing FRAND: A Pseudo-Pool Approach to Standards-Based Patent
Licensing, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 47, 82 (2013) (stating that "numeric proportionality, while perhaps
less precise than might be achieved using a more finely-tuned valuation method, is intended to
provide 'rough justice' in an efficient and administrable manner.").
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too onerous' 85 -but there also are some potential problems. The first is that,
paradoxical though it may sound at first blush, some essential patents are more
essential than others.1 8 6 To say that a patent is "essential" means only that is
essential to the practice of a standard adopted by an SSO; but not every essential
patent is essential, in the everyday sense, to the users of those devices. In Microsoft
Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., for example, fourteen of Motorola's sixteen patents
essential to the H.264 standard related to "interlaced video"-one of many features
that H.264 requires as standard-essential but which, as a practical matter, is rarely
used by consumers of devices such as Microsoft's Xbox.' 8 7 (Put another way, firms
would still find considerable value in marketing products compliant with an H.264
standard that omitted the interlaced video capability.)
The district court
appropriately took this relative lack of importance into account when comparing
Motorola's H.264 patents with the patents included in the MPEG LA H.264 pool.' 8 8
Thus, although one could accord all such patents an equal royalty-a practice that
some, though not all, patent pools, have adopted as a matter of convenience-the
principle of numeric proportionality conflicts with the intuition that, as a matter of
innovation policy, the patents from which users derive more value should command
a higher royalty.
Second, although numeric proportionality conserves on
adjudication costs somewhat, before awarding a royalty to a particular patent the
trier of fact would still need to determine an appropriate royalty base, what portion
of that base should be payable as aggregate patent royalties, and how many other
valid SEPs read on that base. I return to these issues below.
A second possibility would be to borrow yet another page from Judge Robart's
analysis in Microsoft v. Motorola and to use a pool rate-if there happens to be one
for the standard on which the SEP in question reads-as the starting point for
calculating a FRAND rate for the SEP in suit (which the owner chose not to include
in the pool).1 89 In Microsoft itself, Judge Robart inferred that Motorola's decision
not to include its patents in the MPEG LA H.264 pool meant that it expected to
derive more benefits from remaining outside, and he adjusted the royalty

1

6
187

8

8

See Unwired Planet Int'l Ltd. v. Huawei Techs. Co., [2017] EWHC 711, ¶ 182 (Pat. Ct.) (Eng.)
("There was ample evidence before me that . . parties negotiating SEP licences in fact use
methods which are based on patent counting. That is evidence which supports a finding that a
FRAND approach to assessing a royalty rate is to engage in some kind of patent counting. Indeed
when one thinks about it some sort of patent counting is the only practical approach at least for a
portfolio of any size. Trying to evaluate the importance of individual inventions becomes
disproportionate very quickly.").
Cf GEORGE ORWELL, ANIMAL FARM 192 (2009) [1944] ("All animals are equal but some animals
are more equal than others.").
See Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., Case No. C10-1823JLR, 2013 WL 2111217, at *39-49
(W.D. Wash. Apr. 25, 2013), aff'd, 795 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2015).
See id. at *85-86. In setting the rate of the 802.11 patents, the court similarly concluded that the
Motorola SEPs that Microsoft used "provide[d] very minimal technical contribution to the
identified portions of the 802.11 standard." Id. at *92.
See id. at *83-87.
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accordingly.1 90 Nevertheless, given the difficulty of estimating the value to the
owner of remaining outside the pool-a function of the benefits derived from
having access to the pooled patents at a low rate in comparison with the cost of
losing control over the licensing of one's own pooled patents-there is some risk
that whatever adjustment is made will be, to some degree, arbitrary.' 9' Aside from
pool rates, there may be other sources from which courts can find reasonable
comparables in other cases. In the recent decision of the English Patent Court in
Unwired Planet Int'l Ltd. v. Huawei Techs. Co., for example, the court was able to
use as comparables licenses that Ericsson had previously granted to Huawei and
others that included the very same patents that were in suit. (Huawei's license had
expired, however, and Ericsson had assigned the relevant patents to Unwired
Planet.)1 92

Yet another approach would be to apply some version of Judge Holderman's
methodology in In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litigation.193 In Innovatio
the court concluded that the patents in suit were (unlike the 802.11 patents at issue
in Microsoft) "of moderate to moderate-high importance to the 802.11 standard,"
and thus that the Via 802.11 pool, which did not include any high-value patents,
was not an appropriate comparator.' 94 Finding none of the other licenses proffered
by the parties to be comparable either, the court ultimately opted for the defendants'
proposed "top-down" approach. As a first step, the court determined that the
applicable royalty base would be a WiFi chip, which it determined was the
SSPPU.' 9 ' Second, the court calculated the average sales price of a chip ($14.85)
over what the court viewed as the relevant time period, 1997-2013.196 Third, the
court multiplied that price by the estimated average profit margin for WiFi chips
over that period, 12.1%, which resulted in a reduction of the base to $1.80.197
Fourth, the court multiplied the base by 84%, the value believed "attributable to the
top 10% of 802.11 standard-essential patents, to obtain $1.51."19' Finally, the court
190 See id. at *85 n.23.
191 For a (somewhat) critical discussion of Judge Robart's methodology, see Thomas F. Cotter, The
Comparative Law and Economics of Standard-EssentialPatents and FRAND Royalties, 22 TEX.
INTELL. PROP. L.J. 311, 361-62 (2014); Siebrasse & Cotter, Value, supra note 60, at 1172-76.
192 See Unwired Planet, [2017] EWHC 711, ¶¶ 71, 180, 462; Siebrasse & Cotter,
supra note 182,
(manuscript at 22) ("The Ericsson licenses were particularly apt comparators because Unwired
Planet had acquired all the patents in issue from Ericsson and the Ericsson licenses at one time
included all the SEPs in issue: UnwiredPlanet ¶ 180. The agreement between Unwired Planet and
Ericsson was a 'privateering' arrangement, in which Ericsson is entitled to a share of the revenue
from UWP's licensing efforts (Unwired Planet ¶ 64-66), and so the approach adopted by Birss J is
prima facie applicable to other privateering arrangements as well.").
193 In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litigation, No. 11 C 9308, 2013 WL 5593609 (N.D. Ill.
194

Oct. 3, 2013).
Id. at *36.

11

See id. at *12-18.

96 See id. at *41.

'97 See id.
198 See id at *43. The 84% figure comes from a 1998 article by Mark Schankerman, How Valuable Is
Patent Protection? Estimates by Technology Field, 29 RAND J. EcoN. 77, which concluded that
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multiplied $1.51 by 19/300, based on its estimate that there are approximately 3,000
patents essential to the 802.11 standard, so that 300 fall within the "top 10%," and
that Innovatio's 19 SEPs were among these patents.1 99 My own view is that Judge
Holderman's approach has merit, if viewed as a heuristic for according value to the
patents in suit in accordance with some rough idea of their relative importance to
the standard. Nevertheless, as Siebrasse and I argue elsewhere, the court's
assumption that all of the royalties due for the 802.11 SEPs should be payable from
the profits earned on sales of WiFi chips is problematic. Ideally, one would use the
portion of the sales price that typically covers royalty payments, because the profit
margin might stay the same depending on whether the implementer could charge a
higher price to cover its costs.200

More generally, to apply either numeric proportionality or some version of the
top-down approach would appear to require the court to employ some sort of
starting assumption on some or all of the matters discussed below:
The portion of the base that typically is (or should be) payable as royalties. As
noted above, Judge Holderman's assumption that the aggregate royalties due for the
use of all of the SEPs reading on the 802.11 standard would be payable from the
profits earned on the sales of WiFi chips is not very persuasive. Nevertheless, the
intuition that a top-down approach requires some starting assumption of what the
total royalty pool should be seems correct-and one benefit of such an approach
(e.g., presuming that only x% of the revenue making up the base shall be payable as
royalties) is that it would tend to reduce the risk of royalty stacking. 20' But the

"the top 10% of all electronics patents account for 84% of the value in all electronics patents." Id.
I return to the use of the Schankerman study infra at notes 216-18 and accompanying text.
199 See In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litig., No. 11 C 9308, 2013 WL 5593609, at *38, *43

(N.D. 111. Oct. 3. 2013). The court noted, however, that "many of those 3000 patents are likely less
valuable to the standard than Innovatio's patents because their essentiality has not been judicially

confirmed." Id. at *37, *43.
200

See Siebrasse & Cotter, Value, supra note 60, at 1225-26, 1226 nn. 165-166 (arguing in addition
that the court should have used the lower chip prices that have been experienced in recent years in
calculating the base, because the use of such ex post information would better align the royalty
with the technology's actual value). In Unwired Planet, Mr. Justice Birss used a top-down
approach (as a "check" on the rate he derived from the use of comparables) with the estimated total
royalty burden serving as the base. See Unwired Planet, [2017] EWHC 711, I 178, 476-77,

806(9).
201

Siebrasse and I have described royalty stacking as occurring when "a seller incurs an excessive
royalty burden as a result of marketing a product incorporating multiple, separately-owned
patents," and have noted that stacking "can be viewed as a manifestation of the 'Coumot
complements' problem, which arises 'when separate owners of complementary inputs each
demand what is (for them) the individually profit-maximizing price, in exchange for permission to
include those inputs in an end product,' with the result that 'the cost of producing the end product'
will be 'higher than the social optimum."' Siebrasse & Cotter, Value, supra note 60, at 1161 & n.5
(quoting Thomas F. Cotter, Patent Holdup, Patent Remedies, and Antitrust Responses, 34 J. CoRP.
L. 1151, 1169 (2009)). In yet another paper, we question whether the desire to avoid royalty
stacking, however legitimate it may be, can be turned into an operable principle of law, and
suggest that perhaps all an anti-royalty stacking principle "can amount to, as a practical matter, is
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question remains where to find reliable evidence of what the appropriate "royalty
cap" should be. According to one empirical study that was posted on SSRN in
2014, about 25% of the cost of producing an entire smartphone goes to patent
royalties.2 02 The study nevertheless has its critics203 and (to my knowledge) has not
been peer-reviewed. Alternatively, in the Japanese Samsung v. Apple case the court
calculated a FRAND royalty on the assumption of a 5% royalty cap, based on the
fact that other major SEP owners as well as a patent pool for the standard in
question had agreed to such a cap.204 As Siebrasse and I have noted elsewhere,
however, the evidence presented to the court appears to have shown that the SEP
owners agreed to a cap of 50% of the productprice, while the court applied this 5%
to what it called the "contribution ratio," that is, the value it believed the patented
technology added to the standard. 205 Because the published judgment redacted the
amount of the contribution ratio, it is impossible to know what the actual effective
cap was, but it would stand to reason that it surely was much less than 5% of the
product price (and thus could have resulted in a seriously undercompensatory
award). Third, the German Judges Thomas Ktihnen and Christine Maimann are
reported to have proposed at a January 2015 conference an "overall cap on
cumulative royalties payable by an implementer" of "about 25-30 per cent of the
net selling price of the highest-priced standard-compliant product," 206 but the brief

something in the nature of a sanity check-as in Microsoft, where Judge Robart concluded that the
rate Motorola was seeking for certain patents was excessive in part because (1) if every patent
owner sought royalties similar to those Motorola was seeking, the price of the end product would
be untenable, and (2) those particular patents constituted only minor contributions to the standard."
Siebrasse & Cotter, supra note 182 (manuscript at 6) (citing Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No.
C10-1823JLR, 2013 WL 2111217, at *73 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 25, 2013). Alternatively, Stem has
a rebuttable presumption that royalty stacking occurs at some
argued there should be "at least ...
SEP level, say 50 or 100 SEPS.. . . That would shift the burden to the patent holder to produce
evidence of no stacking," Stern, supra note 180, at 552, but it's not clear to me exactly what the
presumption's impact on damages would be.
202 See Ann Armstrong et al., Surveying Royalty Demands for the Components within the Modern
Smartphone (May 29, 2014), at 14, availableat http://ssm.com/abstract-2443848.
203 See Jorge Contreras, Patents, Technical Standards, and Standards-Setting Organizations: A
Survey of the Empirical, Legal and Economics Literature, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE
ECONOMICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW, (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 18 & n.10)
(availableat https://papers.ssrn.com/abstractid=2900540) (referencing the literature).
204

Intellectual Property High Court May 16, 2014, 2013 (Ne) 11043 (Japan), at 63-64 of English

See also
translation available at http://www.ip.courts.go.jp/eng/vcms_1f/25ne0043full.pdf.
Unwired Planet, [2017] EWHC 711, ¶¶ 178, 476-79 (concluding, based on evidence presented,
that the total royalty burden for 4G/LTE standard compliant multimode handsets was 8.8%).
205 See id. at 63.
206 See Nadine Herrmann & Catherine Manley, Germany: IP and Antitrust, GCR EURO. ANTITRUST
at
available
2016,
REv.
http://globalcompetitionreview.com/reviews/72/sections/249/chapters/2922/germany-ip-antitrust/
(reporting on the judges' presentation); see also TORSTEN KORBER, STANDARDESSENTIELLE
PATENTE,

FRAND-VERPFLICHTUNGEN

UND

KARTELLRECHT/STANDARD

ESSENTIAL

PATENTS,

FRAND COMMITMENTS AND COMPETITION LAW 228-51 (2013) (proposing that, for purposes of
determining whether a party has made a FRAND offer, courts should consider, inter alia,
aggregate royalty caps as proposed in "legal and economic scholarly writing," and perhaps should
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discussion of their proposal cited in the note below does not clarify how they
derived this figure. Thus, while these three sources may be useful, more work
needs to be done to establish a firm basis for a presumptive royalty cap.
The number of valid and essential SEPs reading on the base. To determine
how much of the aggregate royalty should be attributable to the average patent
requires some basis for inferring the number of such patents reading on the SEP. In
some instances, there may be credible independent estimates of the number of SEPs
reading on a particular standard. In the Innovatio case, for example, Judge
Holderman relied on, among other things, a report prepared by the PA Consulting
Group as evidence that there were approximately 3,000 patents potentially essential
to the 802.11 standard.207 More specifically, the PA report, which was developed
independently of the litigation and "based on a search of all patents for keywords
related to the 802.11 standard and a technical analysis of a portion of the search
results" concluded that "there are 3106 patents potentially essential to the 802.11
standard." 2 0 8 Judge Holderman also noted that that the plaintiff's expert "testified
that there are 'at least hundreds' of 802.11 standard-essential patents, and . .. did
not disagree with an assertion that there are 'a couple of thousand patents' covering
the 802.11 standard." 20 9 In addition, he cited Judge Robart's finding in Microsoft v.
Motorola "that 92 entities have submitted letters of assurance to the IEEE indicating
that they would license their over 350 patents at a RAND rate, and at least another
59 companies have filed blanket letters of assurance covering an undisclosed
number of patents," and concluded that if the plaintiff had "an average size patent
portfolio, and . . each of the 59 companies submitting blanket letters of assurance
has twenty-three patents like Innovatio, there would be approximately 1700
standard-essential patents," a number "consistent with Judge Robart's acceptance of
Dr. Lynde's testimony in that case that there are possibly 'thousands' of patents
essential to the 802.11 standard." 210 Finally, he noted that defense expert "Dr.
Lynde relied on another report by Sunlight Research and concluded that there are
3,266 patents aside from Innovatio's patents that are potentially essential to the
802.11 standard." 2 1
Judge Holderman also observed, however, that not all of the 3,000 or so
patents estimated to read on the 802.11 standard were likely to be valid, essential in
fact, and infringed.212 Rather than trying to estimate how many patents fit into this

207
208
209
210
211

212

apply a rebuttable presumption of numeric proportionality under which all SEPs are entitled to an
equal royalty).
See In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litig., No. 11 C 9308, 2013 WL 5593609, at *41
(N.D. 111. Oct. 3, 2013).
id
id.
id.
id.
See id. at 43 ("in the Microsoft case, Judge Robart explained that at least one of Motorola's alleged
standard-essential patents was found not to be standard-essential by the Via Patent Licensing
pool .... It is likely that many other allegedly standard-essential patents would be found not
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category, however, he stated only that he would be "cognizant of the fact that many
of those 3000 patents are likely less valuable to the standard than Innovatio's
patents because their essentiality has not been judicially confirmed," 2 13 which is the
next point I address below. In addition, there is some independent evidence
indicating that a large portion of declared SEPs are not, in fact, essential, though the
most recent formal study of which I am aware is now a few years old.214 As with
the proposals on a royalty cap, more work needs to be done to firm up the number
of valid, infringed, and essential SEPs that read on the standards that are showing
up in litigation.

215

The percentage of these SEPs that are of (roughly) equal importance to the
patents in suit, and the percentage of standard value represented by this class of
patents. As noted, Judge Holderman relied on a study published by Mark
Schankerman finding that "the top 10% of all electronics patents account for 84% of
This particular finding from the
the value in all electronics patents."2 16
Schankerman study, however, is based on the renewal rate for patents filed in 1970
in the U.S., France, Germany, Japan, and the U.K.,2 17 which raises the question
whether the "fit" between the finding and the facts specific to a contemporary patent
case would satisfy the Federal Circuit's current understanding of the Federal Rules
of Evidence. 2 18 Nevertheless, the core finding that patent value is highly skewedwith most of the high-value patents inhabiting the long tail of a log-normal
distribution-is one that has been replicated in other studies involving other time
periods, though the precise quantifications may vary.219 Once again, further
research might help to provide a firmer basis for a presumption.
essential after undergoing a judicial analysis such as the one this court conducted during the July
2013 essentiality hearing to determine that all of the claims in Innovatio's twenty-three patents are
standard-essential. Innovatio's confirmed standard-essential patents are by virtue of that
confirmation more valuable to the 802.11 standard than many of the potentially essential patents, at
least some of which will be found to be not essential.").
213

See Innovatio, 2013 WL 5593609, at *43.

214 See FAIRFIELD RESOURCES INTERNATIONAL, INC., REVIEW OF PATENTS DECLARED AS ESSENTIAL TO

LTE AND SAE (4G WIRELESS STANDARDS) THROUGH JUNE 30, 2009 (Jan. 6, 2010), available at
http://www.frlicense.com/LTE%20Final% 20Report.pdf; FAIRFIELD RESOURCES INTERNATIONAL,
INC., REVIEW OF PATENTS DECLARED AS ESSENTIAL TO WCDMA THROUGH DECEMBER, 2008 (Jan.

6, 2009), available at http://www.frlicense.com/wcdmal.pdf (in studies conducted by Robert A.
Myers and David J. Goodman and funded by Nokia, reporting that half or fewer of the patents
declared essential to various standards were essential as judged by the authors' panel of experts).
215 See also UnwiredPlanet, [2017] EWHC 711, ¶¶ 200, 205, 377-79 (estimating that Unwired Planet
owned 6 of 800 patent "families" reading on the 4G standard); Siebrasse & Cotter, supra note 182,
(manuscript at 23).
216 Innovatio, 2013 WL 5593609, at *43 (stating that "Dr. Leonard adjusted the value attributable to
Innovatio's patents in each of those cases by relying on a 1998 article finding that the top 10% of
all electronics patents account for 84% of the value in all electronics patents. (See DTX-192, Mark
Schankerman, How Valuable is Patent Protection? Estimates By Technology Field, 29 RAND J.

Econ. 77, 94 tbl.5 & n.12 (1998).)").

217 See Schankerman, supra note 198, at 78.
218 I thank Rudi Bekkers for pointing this out to me in conversation.
219 A recent study by Jonathan Putnam, for example, aggregates several other studies of patent value
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In summary, one might reasonably question whether the conclusions from the
studies referenced above are extendable to cases arising at different time periods or
involving different standards. And surely it would be a mistake simply to use any
study that comes to hand as a starting point for calculating FRAND royalties.
Indeed, to do so would be givmg in too easily to the availability and
representativeness heuristics (though as Landes and Posner have noted in a different
context from within IP law, even the availability heuristic is not necessarily
irrational). 22 0 As long as the basic finding at issue-that a large plurality of SEPs
are not essential, that the aggregate royalty burden is unlikely to exceed a quarter or
a third, that the number of SEPs reading on a given standard is in the thousands, or
that only a small percentage of patents contribute most of the value-is in general
defensible, perhaps the better practice even now would be to permit expert
testimony premised on these assumptions holding true in the case at bar, while
permitting the opposing side to rebut the premise with whatever counterevidence it
can muster. As with Nash Bargaining, to forbid the testimony altogether means,
again, that the court's only recourse may be to "comparable" licenses which
themselves may be highly flawed indicators of the value of the specific patent in
suit. Moreover, as I suggested above, in choosing among heuristics the goal should
be to choose the one with the lower aggregate sum of administrative and error costs.
Although these costs themselves are not quantifiable, if there is reason to believe
that the assumptions underlying a top-down approach are at least in the ballpark,
ruling out their use altogether on evidentiary grounds may be short-sighted.
V. Conclusion
The slogan "The perfect is the enemy of the good" may be a clich6, but it sums
up the case for judicious (and judicial) use of heuristics pretty well. As this paper
has shown, courts both employ heuristics, and respond to perceived heuristic biases
on the part of factfinders, in a variety of situations relating to patent damages
awards. Nevertheless, my perception is that courts often do not recognize their own
vulnerability to heuristic biases-the fixation on supposedly comparable licenses
could be seen as an example of representativeness bias, for example-or, more
generally, that the choice facing them is often between or among competing
heuristics. Ideally, that choice should involve a comparison of the aggregate sums
of the administrative and accuracy costs of each alternative; and while a precise
comparison of these sums surely lies beyond anyone's capability, I have argued that

based on renewal rates and similarly reports a highly skewed value (though only 64%, not 84%, for
the top 10% of patents), but the study is unpublished. See Jonathan D. Putnam, Value Shares of
Technologically
Complex
Products
(Apr.
16,
2014),
available
at
www.competitiondynamics.com/wp-content/uploads/Value-Shares-20140416.pdf.
220 See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL

PROPERTY LAW 161 & n.31 (2005) (noting that "the availability heuristic is not necessarily
irrational").
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at least in some circumstances courts can reach a reasoned conclusion concerning
which sum is likely to be smaller. Less rigorous proof may be warranted, for
example, when the stakes of the dispute are low and the defendant is at fault; and
courts arguably should be more open to experts' use of starting points such as the
Nash Bargaining framework, aggregate royalty caps, and other related assumptions
to avoid overreliance on suspect comparables. (In a sense, the approach I am
advocating here is similar in spirit to that articulated by the German courts, and
perhaps required of U.S. courts as well under § 284 of the Patent Act, of making a
rough estimate of damages once the parties have met some minimal evidentiary
threshold, even when that evidence falls short of the ideal.) 22 1 At the same time,
courts should be vigilant in rejecting the allure of simple but illogical (or only
weakly supported) rules like the U.K. rule relating to noninfringing alternatives or
the late but (largely) unlamented U.S. version of the 25% Rule of Thumb.
Treading this line is, to be sure, a tall order, though as we have seen in the
FRAND context in particular some courts appear to be moving in this direction.
And there are analogies in other bodies of law as well. Perhaps the most obvious
counterpart is antitrust law, where the initial questions presented often are whether
the conduct at issue is so clearly anticompetitive that it may be conclusively
presumed (per se) illegal, or whether its possible procompetitive benefits are such
that a more nuanced rule of reason inquiry is appropriate; and if the latter, what
evidence suffices to shift the burden of further evidentiary production from one
party to the other and in what sequence. As the Supreme Court has intoned on more
than one occasion, in such settings "the quality of the proof required should vary
with the circumstances." 2 2 2 Courts would be well-advised to follow this maxim in
the context of patent damages as well.
More controversial, perhaps, is the idea that courts should learn from
experience by adopting presumptions or starting points based on the existing
empirical evidence (assuming it meets some minimal standard of adequacy);
encouraging the parties and others to develop better evidence over time; and when
necessary adjusting these initial presumptions or starting points in the light of newly
developed evidence. To be sure, in some ways such a practice may seem a poor fit
for an adjudicatory system that places a high value on stare decisis,223 or to confuse
the distinction between making law and finding facts.224 Nevertheless, I am
221 See supratext accompanying notes 73-77.
222 See FTC v. Actavis, Inc. 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2238 (2013) (quotations omitted).

See also Tyson

Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036, 1046 (2016) (affirming certification of a class of
employees alleging lack of compensation for the time spent donning and doffing protective gear,
based on representative evidence of the time a typical employee spends to perform these tasks;
"[i]n many cases, a representative sample is 'the only practicable means to collect and present
relevant data') (quoting MANUAL OF COMPLEX LITIGATION § 11.493, at 102 (4th ed. 2004)).
223 I thank Francis Shen-who also guided me to the literature on hyper- and metaheuristics-for
raising this point.
224 Cf Rebecca Haw Allensworth, Law and the Art of Modeling: Are Models Facts?, 103 GEo. L.J.
825 (2015) (arguing that courts should review scientific and economic models as matters of law,
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encouraged by the U.S. courts' efforts in the FRAND arena in particular to engage
in efforts consistent with such an approach; and I hope that this paper's analysis of
patent damages law as an exercise in heuristics will motivate others to improve
upon my initial effort in this regard. For like other bodies of law, the law of patent
damages is a work in progress. May it always be so.

not fact).

